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SILENCING STATE COURTS
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ABSTRACT
In state courts across the Nation, an absolutist conception of the First Amendment
is preempting common law speech torts. From intentional infliction of emotional
distress and intrusion upon seclusion, to intentional interference with contractual
relations and negligent infliction of emotional distress, state courts are dismissing
speech tort claims on the pleadings because of the broad First Amendment defense
recognized by Snyder v. Phelps in 2011. This Article argues, contrary to the scholarly
consensus, that Snyder was a categorical departure from the methodology adopted
by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the landmark 1964 case that first applied the First
Amendment against state common law. Sullivan, on the one hand, was a classical
common law decision, taking the internal point of view with respect to state common
law. Snyder, on the other, was only concerned with the existence of protected speech,
an issue for which state common law was irrelevant. This Article contends that Snyder’s
absolutism has negative systemic consequences for judicial federalism: courts are
unnecessarily prevented from judging certain conduct right or wrong under the local
standards of state tort law, even if the First Amendment ultimately immunizes a defen-
dant from liability. Sullivan’s methodology is better than Snyder’s because it embraced
cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan has underwritten fifty years of productive
state-federal judicial dialogue; in just seven years, Snyder has censored every signifi-
cant opportunity for cross-systemic judicial conversation.
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INTRODUCTION
A strange thing is happening to common law speech torts. In state courts across
the Nation, they’re disappearing, preempted by the First Amendment. From a New
Hampshire city suing its libertarian residents for harassing city officers,1 to brothers suing
a TV station in Arizona for broadcasting their father’s suicide,2 to a Wisconsinite
school bus driver suing a journalist for publicizing her petty criminal history,3 to a
woman suing her ex-boyfriend’s mother for plastering missing-person posters outside
her home in Connecticut,4 the First Amendment is preempting intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED), intrusion upon seclusion, intentional interference with
contractual relations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ignoring hornbook
constitutional avoidance doctrine, state courts routinely decide the First Amendment
question—whether the speech is protected—while consciously refusing to consider
the common law question—whether the speech is tortious in the first place—that is
logically (and legally) prior. This is backwards avoidance: state courts avoid a run-of-
the-mill private law issue by deciding a significant federal constitutional question.
Perhaps worse, state courts often dismiss these common law claims before dis-
covery. It turns out that once the First Amendment appears, these lawsuits do not need
developed factual records.5 That’s because there are only three facts that matter to
1 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015).
2 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
3 Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
4 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920 (Conn. 2015).
5 See infra Section II.B.3.
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the First Amendment: the violence, location, and content of the speech. Nonviolent
expressive conduct that is in public view and on a matter of public concern is immu-
nized. The most important question by far is whether the speech’s content falls within
a roomy conception of public concern. In these cases, the First Amendment doctrine
requiring appellate courts to independently and closely examine the factual record
is a mirage. The First Amendment denies plaintiffs not only a trial, but also the more
basic opportunity to present their case.6
The culprit is the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Snyder v. Phelps.7 In Snyder,
the father of a fallen Marine sued members of the fundamentalist Westboro Baptist
Church for emotional harm caused by their picketing of his son’s funeral.8 The Supreme
Court set aside the father’s $5 million jury verdict.9 “As a Nation,” wrote Chief Justice
Roberts for the majority of eight, “we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”10 Paying almost no
attention to Maryland law, Roberts announced that the First Amendment provides
a public concern defense in all state tort suits affixing liability to speech.11 Rather than
begin with state common law rules of liability, Roberts “beg[a]n[ ] in the opposite
corner with the First Amendment.”12 State courts picked up Snyder’s all-purpose
federal defense and have run with it. Speech on a matter of public concern (an
expansive category) is privileged.
This Article offers a sustained methodological critique of Snyder through the struc-
tural lens of judicial federalism (the relationship between the state and federal court
systems). To be clear, it does not argue that Snyder’s outcome was wrong or that Snyder
was an unconstitutional exercise of power. Regardless of your theory of incorporation,13
the reconstructed First Amendment applies in full force against the states. And it’s a First
Amendment truism that civil damages cannot be imposed for protected speech.14 If
6 This Article takes state courts seriously. See also Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying
the New Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (noting the “state court knowledge
deficit”); Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 4) (“[S]tate courts matter.”).
7 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
8 Id. at 449–50.
9 Id. at 450, 459.
10 Id. at 461.
11 Id. at 451–53.
12 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 292.
13 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 137–230 (1998) (tracing the history of the incorporation debate, criticizing the total and
selective incorporation models, and proposing the refined incorporation model); id. at
231–46 (discussing the incorporation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
14 Private figure plaintiffs can recover actual damages for defamation if they prove
negligence. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). See generally
David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (arguing for more
remedial flexibility in the application of the First Amendment to speech torts).
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we accept that Westboro’s speech was protected, then Snyder rightly set aside the
jury verdict.
But the existence of protected speech is not the only legal inquiry. State common
law speech torts can be legitimately constitutionalized in two broad ways. Snyder
represents the first model. On this view, the First Amendment is an external limit that
precludes a state from imposing liability for speech of public concern. Its vision of
the First Amendment is absolutist because it protects speech of public concern
regardless of context, form, factual record, and theory of liability. The first (and, most
of the time, only) question is whether the content of the defendant’s speech is of public
concern. If it is, then the plaintiff’s allegation—whether sounding in IIED, a privacy
tort, an economic tort, negligence, or some other theory of civil liability—is simply
irrelevant. This enables backwards avoidance, making it unnecessary for a court to
decide if the state tort actually covers the speech. Only the speech matters: if speech
is protected, the state is preempted. Snyder, then, contributed to the ongoing “rule-
ification” of the First Amendment and adopted a rule-conflict model for its
enforcement.15 The external limit of the First Amendment invalidates or strikes down
the tort. This model fits neatly into the emergent paradigm of thinking about the First
Amendment as an unstoppable force, a Lochner-esque preemption machine.16
There is another way. The second model views the First Amendment as an
internal limit on the state right of action. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,17 our
index case deploying the First Amendment to limit state common law torts, Justice
Brennan established the famous “federal rule,”18 also characterized as a “conditional
privilege,”19 that a public official is “prohibit[ed] . . . from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”20 On this view, the threshold
question is whether the application of state rules of law would impose liability for
expressive conduct. If yes, then there is state action, and only then is the First Amend-
ment inquiry taken up. This view considers crucially important not only the verdict,
but also the legal reasons—the rules and principles of state law—purporting to
legitimize the verdict. Rather than simply set aside the verdict because it punishes
speech, this model interrogates and refashions the state common law underwriting
the verdict, molding that law to ensure it conforms to the First Amendment.
15 Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103,
106 (2012).
16 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1199, 1207–09 (2015).
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Id. at 279–80.
19 Id. at 282 n.21. The Supreme Court took the characterization of the federal rule as a
privilege from a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas. Id. at 280 (citing Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
20 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
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The claim that Snyder and Sullivan represent different models of First Amendment
enforcement is contentious and needs justification. Indeed, the scholarly consensus is
that both Sullivan and Snyder operate as external, all-or-nothing limits on the states.21
On the contrary, this Article argues that scholars have been too quick to align Snyder
with Sullivan. This Article drives a wedge between their models of First Amendment
enforcement by arguing that Sullivan, unlike Snyder, is a common law decision.
Specifically, this Article argues that Brennan’s opinion adopted the internal point
of view vis-à-vis Alabama’s common law.22 As a threshold matter, Sullivan rested
its authority to rewrite state common law on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23
It rightly accepted that the rules and principles of state common law, and not only
the ancillary orders enforcing state judgments, count as state action.24 By piercing
the libel verdict’s veil, Brennan subjected the legal reasons purporting to legitimize
that verdict to First Amendment scrutiny. Brennan did not throw out Alabama’s libel
tort; rather, he accepted Alabama’s common law of libel as far as constitutionally
permissible.25 This attitude—a practical attitude of accepting state common law—is
the internal point of view.
Drawing on a theory of common law adjudication,26 this Article argues that
adopting the internal point of view towards state common law explains why Sullivan
is a common law decision. The common law is a disciplined exercise of practical
reason that reflects and informs the complex texture of daily life and relationships
of members of the political community. State courts, which are the primary re-
positories of the common law, pride themselves on their status as common law courts.
Because they are closer to the people, state courts prefer to solve problems with local
rules. This, in turn, opens a dialogue on two fronts: first, with other state courts who
21 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts,
104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 53) (placing Snyder in “the Court’s
sequence of decisions” originating with Sullivan); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433,
437–43 (2016) (situating Snyder as an extension of Sullivan’s approach); Han, supra note
14, at 1175 (discussing “the Supreme Court’s general adherence to the all-or-nothing approach
in speech-tort cases ranging from Sullivan through Snyder.”); Nathan B. Oman & Jason M.
Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1162–63 (2013)
(situating Snyder as an extension of Sullivan’s approach); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort,
Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1157 (2015)
(“[I]n the line of cases from Sullivan and Snyder, the Court has attempted to establish a cate-
gorical, quasi-legislative scheme of dignitary tort.”).
22 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
23 Id. at 265–92.
24 See id. at 265.
25 Id. at 265–92.
26 See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155 (2002) [hereinafter Postema, Part I]; Gerald J. Postema, Classical
Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1 (2003) [herein-
after Postema, Part II].
6 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
adopt or reject analogous common law rules, and second, with local legislatures who
prefer to comprehensively regulate.
Armed with the internal point of view to Alabama law, Sullivan adopted this
common law methodology, and resolved a long-standing common law debate. In the
early twentieth century, state courts debated the existence of a conditional privilege
in defamation for criticism of public officials or candidates for public office.27
Sullivan accepted a modified version of the so-called “liberal rule,” which permitted
the conditional privilege, quoting extensively from Rousseau Burch’s 1908 opinion
for the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman v. MacLennan.28 Interestingly, the debate
played out at the American Law Institute’s [ALI] 1937 annual meeting. During dis-
cussion of a tentative draft of the First Torts Restatement, Burch, who had written
Coleman thirty years earlier, debated Learned Hand, who rejected the liberal rule.
Learned Hand convinced the ALI membership. The views of the author of Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten29 on the relationship between libel and free speech, artic-
ulated nearly thirty years before Sullivan, are of independent interest.
Finally, this Article argues that Sullivan’s methodology is preferable to Snyder’s
because Sullivan embraced, and Snyder eschewed, cooperative judicial federalism.30
Snyder shut down the articulation of state law. Because doctrine is a public good,
silencing state courts on state law—here, the unnecessary federal preemption of state
speech torts—is a systemic ill. Cooperative judicial federalism focuses on the value
of judicial dialogue between federal and state courts. It flourishes particularly when
a state right of action embeds a federal issue (and vice versa) because those cases
generate mixed questions of state and federal law. Exercising concurrent jurisdiction,
state and federal courts respond to each other’s opinions, shape the contours of their
own (and each other’s) law, and ensure state compliance with federal law. While
Sullivan’s common law methodology inaugurated over fifty years of productive state-
federal judicial dialogue, in just seven years Snyder’s absolutism has suppressed every
significant opportunity for intersystemic judicial conversation. One of Sullivan’s
unheralded virtues, then, is that it created the right conditions for a genuinely coop-
erative judicial federalism. That’s a compelling reason to prefer the Sullivan model.
There is a deep irony in Snyder’s model of First Amendment enforcement. Snyder’s
constitutional defense, in the words of one state court, “avoid[s] a ‘prolonged, costly,
27 See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
28 Id. at 285. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281–82 n.21.
29 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). See generally Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-
Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that in Masses, “Hand was the first judge to place heavy reliance
on democratic theory in seeking to understand the meaning of the first amendment,” and that
his premises and reasoning “have become the basic, though often unacknowledged, features
of modern first amendment analysis”).
30 “Judicial federalism” is used broadly to refer to the relationship between the state and
federal courts.
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and inevitably futile trial.’”31 But a trial isn’t futile for a losing plaintiff. Indeed, even
pretrial litigation isn’t futile if it permits plaintiffs to properly and completely
communicate their injury. Pretrial discovery and motion practice allow the tort
plaintiff to allege: that defendant wronged me.32 Snyder’s First Amendment, however,
silences this expressive function of tort law. Moreover, it’s ironic that Snyder’s First
Amendment smothers the articulation of state law. In an IIED suit, for example,
surely it is speech of public concern when a court expresses the local political com-
munity’s collective judgment that a defendant acted beyond all possible bounds of
civilized conduct. The First Amendment enforces the national community’s judgment
that the defendant shouldn’t pay damages for that conduct; it does not follow that
reasoned elaboration of the local community’s judgment is worthless.
The argument proceeds as follows. After Part I describes the reasoning and
significance of Sullivan and Snyder, Part II distinguishes between their models of
First Amendment enforcement. It defends the thesis that Sullivan is a common law
decision by arguing that Brennan adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis
Alabama’s common law. But Snyder enforced an external, absolutist vision of the
First Amendment, which has shut down the articulation of state common law by state
courts. Finally, Part III argues that Sullivan’s methodology is superior to Snyder’s
because it embraced cooperative judicial federalism and generated decades of
productive state-federal judicial dialogue.
I. SULLIVAN AND SNYDER
This Part describes the reasoning and significance of the Article’s two focal
points, Sullivan and Snyder. In sum, Sullivan is necessary to the legitimacy of the
United States; Snyder is not so consequential. Latent in the following discussion is
that these two cases are symbols, representing not only choices about how the First
Amendment is enforced against the states, but also choices about how federal and
state law writ large interact. Lurking unarticulated in each is a vision of judicial
federalism. Parts II and III will draw out those different visions.
A. Sullivan
On November 3, 1960, Lester Bruce Sullivan, the elected Police Commissioner
of Montgomery, Alabama, was “very pleased.”33 Twelve “outstanding jurors”34 had
31 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)
(citation omitted).
32 Scott Hershovitz recently argued that tort law serves an expressive function. See Scott
Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. Tort
L. 405, 406 (2017) (“What message does tort liability send? At the least, this: The defendant
wronged the plaintiff.”).
33 Jury Awards $500,000 In Alabama Libel Suit, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 4, 1960, at 29.
34 Id.
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just awarded him $500,000 for an alleged libel contained in a paid advertisement in
the New York Times describing police harassment and abuse. The largest libel award
in Alabama history,35 it was also the most damaging salvo in Sullivan’s campaign
against the northern press. Earlier that year, on his thirty-ninth birthday, Sullivan had
issued a statement excoriating the “prejudiced northern press” and its program of
“further[ing] . . . racial strife and exploitation for financial gain and spectacular dis-
torted news coverage.”36
Sullivan’s active prosecution of the media starkly contrasted with his passive (to
put it generously) policing of white brutality. On February 27, 1960, a white man
clubbed Christine Stovall, a twenty-two-year-old black woman, over the back of the
head.37 The press reported that nearby police made no arrests.38 Sullivan said, “[o]ur
hands were tied . . . because officers didn’t arrive on the scene until the disturbance
was over . . . and they couldn’t arrest anyone without a complaint.”39 The following
year, as Freedom Riders arrived in Montgomery on a Greyhound Bus, the city’s
police force was nowhere to be found.40 The Freedom Riders were mercilessly
beaten.41 Sullivan said, “we have no intention of standing police guard for a bunch
of trouble makers coming into our city and making trouble.”42
It was left to the federal courts to police Sullivan. His abnegation of duty earned
an injunction from District Judge Frank M. Johnson, who found “that the Montgom-
ery Police Department, under the direction of Sullivan . . . willfully and deliberately
failed to take measures to ensure the safety of the students and to prevent unlawful
acts of violence upon their persons,” which “continued even after the arrival of the
bus.”43 Sullivan’s attempt to weaponize libel was thwarted by the Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.44 Justice Brennan reversed Sullivan’s damages award
by establishing the famous “federal rule,”45 also characterized as a “‘conditional’
35 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
35 (1991). In 1964, as now, libel in Alabama is a common law cause of action subject to some
statutory regulation.
36 Statement by L. B. Sullivan, March 5, 1960, available at http://archives-alabama-primo
.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/01ALABAMA:default_scope:01ALABAMA_ALMA2161389700
02743 [https://perma.cc/TNG8-CSD4].
37 Montgomery Woman Beaten, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1960, at 51.
38 Id.
39 Sitdown Campaigns Are Pushed, ANNISTON STAR, Feb. 29, 1960, at 1.
40 LEWIS, supra note 35, at 10–11.
41 Don Martin, U.S. Official Is Knocked Unconscious: Montgomery Police Break Up
Scuffles With Tear Gas, WASH. POST, May 21, 1961, at A1.
42 Id. at A6. Sullivan tried to leverage all the attention into a gubernatorial candidacy, “if
public reaction continue[d] to be favorable.” Alabama Cop May Seek Post, CHI. DAILY
DEFENDER, July 17, 1961, at 11.
43 United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 901
(M.D. Ala. 1961).
44 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45 Id. at 279.
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privilege,”46 that a public official is “prohibit[ed] . . . from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”47
The Court in Sullivan also claimed power to “‘make an independent examination
of the whole record’ . . . to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”48 Brennan disposed of a Seventh
Amendment objection on two distinct grounds. First, he observed that the Seventh
Amendment “does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of
federal law have been properly applied to the facts.”49 Second, Brennan pointed out
that the Supreme Court is empowered to review a state court’s findings of fact
“‘where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so inter-
mingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze
the facts.’”50 In Sullivan, the first ground did all the work: the facts, as found, showed
that the advertisement was not of and concerning Sullivan, and its publication did
not amount to actual malice.51
The Sullivan case was “an occasion for dancing in the streets”52 and the most
important First Amendment decision of the twentieth century.53 It held that a state’s
law of libel “can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and
“must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”54 The Court staked
out the “central meaning of the First Amendment” as the abolition of seditious libel.55
And it concluded that the federal rule protected the good-faith publication of criticism
of public officials who enforced discriminatory laws and policies in the south.56
Sullivan, then, stood at a nexus of the private law of torts, the First Amendment, and
federalism. First, aided by sympathetic state courts, Sullivan had obtained a private
law tort remedy against the publisher of a paid advertisement criticizing official con-
duct. According to M. Roland Nachman, Jr., Sullivan’s lawyer, an award of damages
for the advertisement was “within the normal, usual rubric and framework of libel.”57
46 Id. at 282 n.21.
47 Id. at 279–80.
48 Id. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
49 Id. at 285 n.26.
50 Id. (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385–86 (1927)).
51 Id. at 285–92.
52 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting a personal conversation with
Alexander Meiklejohn).
53 Henry Paul Monaghan, In Memoriam—Herbert Wechsler, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1375 (2000).
54 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
55 Id. at 273.
56 See id. at 292.
57 Oral Argument at 01:23:59, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No.
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Second, at the time conventional doctrine held that the First Amendment did not
protect libel. Professor Herbert Wechsler, representing the New York Times, agitated
against that ingrained view, and announced that the Alabama judgment “poses . . .
hazards to the freedom of the press of a dimension not confronted since the early days
[of] the Republic.”58 Third, Nachman not only argued that libel fell outside the First
Amendment as a doctrinal matter.59 He also argued that “[t]he Court has left the
characterization of publications as libelous or not libelous to the States.”60 In other
words, there can be no federal common law of libel.
It is worth pausing to emphasize Sullivan’s stakes. Its enforcement of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments against state common law was part of an epic constitu-
tional struggle. Sullivan and its plaintiff cannot be disentangled from the Jim Crow
south, as Anthony Lewis chronicled in elegant detail.61 The menace of racism infected
the trial: the Times found it difficult to retain local counsel; to avoid violence, its New
York attorneys stayed in Alabama motels under assumed names; Sullivan’s lawyers
struck two African Americans from the list of thirty-six potential jurors; and the trial
judge was a Confederate zealot.62 Nor was Sullivan the only libel action afoot against
the Times. A cluster of lawsuits threatened the paper’s financial viability.63 Indeed, a
loss for the Times may have silenced national coverage of the civil rights movement.64
There are, moreover, strong reasons to think that Sullivan is necessary for a free
society. It is closely aligned with the eradication of seditious libel—the central thrust
of, or one of the core policies underlying, the First Amendment.65 The Madison and
Meiklejohn arguments about self-government establish that the minimal conception
of free expression protects criticism of government.66 And Rawls argued that the
absence of the crime of seditious libel is a necessary condition of a free society:
So long as this crime exists the public press and free discussion
cannot play their role in informing the electorate. And, plainly,
39), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/warren11/oral_argument_audio/14501 [https://perma.cc
/A8Y6-YGSF].
58 Id. at 00:00:27.
59 See id. at 01:23:21.
60 Id.
61 See generally LEWIS, supra note 35, at 15–22 (describing racial segregation and
discrimination in the United States in the mid-twentieth century, especially in Alabama and
the south, where it “was . . . far more virulent, because it had force of law,” and was a defining
characteristic of “the atmosphere in Alabama as The New York Times prepared to defend
itself in court in Montgomery against the first libel action, brought by Commissioner Sullivan”).
62 Id. at 24–27.
63 See id. at 42.
64 See id. at 34–45 (noting that the suit by Sullivan was designed “to choke off a process
that was educating the country about the nature of racism and was affecting public attitudes
on that issue”).
65 Monaghan, supra note 53, at 1376 n.34.
66 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275, 297 (1964).
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to allow the crime of seditious libel would undermine the wider
possibilities of self-government and the several liberties required
for its protection. Thus the great importance of New York Times
v. Sullivan.67
For Rawls, the freedom of political speech is essential “to any fully adequate scheme
of basic liberties.”68
B. Snyder
On March 10, 2006, Albert Snyder rode with his ex-wife and their two daughters
to St. John’s Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland.69 They were attending the
funeral of Snyder’s son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who had died in Iraq
in the line of duty a week earlier.70 As the funeral procession pulled into the church
grounds, Snyder saw the tops of some signs held by picketers between 200 and 300
feet away.71 He did not learn what was written on the signs until later that day, when
someone switched on the news at a private wake in his parents’ home.72
The picketers were seven members of the Westboro Baptist Church. Westboro
deploys confrontational tactics to preach its Calvinist theology, which Randall
Balmer, Westboro’s expert witness and a respected historian of American religion,
described as “fire-and-brimstone,” “fundamentalist militancy,” and “‘prophetic’ and
condemnatory.”73 Westboro preaches that the United States “is full of sin, and proud
of her sin.”74 “This proud sin,” Westboro members said in sworn affidavits, “does not
just include homosexuality, though that is a major one.”75 Adultery, divorce, remarriage,
and idolatry are also among the “institutionalize[d] sin[s].”76 The United States, they
say, “has become a nation of idolaters, and their main idols are the military uniform,
the American flag, and patriotism.”77 Coupled with the view that the United States
67 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 343 (2005).
68 Id. (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44).
69 See Michael Smerconish, He Looked Hate in the Eye, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2014), http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/al-snyder-westboro-baptist-church-104353
[https://perma.cc/93JC-X3UX]; Mike Argento, Time of Solace, Signs of Hate, YORK DAILY
RECORD, Mar. 11, 2006, at 01.
70 Argento, supra note 69.
71 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 449 (2011).
72 Id.
73 Statement of Randall Balmer, Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008)
(No. RDB-06-1389), 2007 WL 3118533, at 3–6.
74 Affidavit of Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis at ¶ 17, Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567
(D. Md. 2008) (No. 06-CV-1389).
75 Id. ¶ 63.
76 Id. ¶¶ 17, 63.
77 Id. ¶ 18.
12 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
“is de facto Babylon” are beliefs that Westboro members are prophets, that scriptural
“discussions about the fall of Babylon . . . are in fact for America,” that tragedies are
punishments from God, and that the Iraq war was “a precursor to the destruction of
this nation and this world.”78 It follows that “we have a duty to publish to this nation,
and the world, a message that God is punishing them for their proud sins.”79
So, on March 10, 2006, Fred Phelps, two of his adult daughters, and four of his
minor grandchildren picketed Matthew Snyder’s funeral.80 After about forty-five
minutes of picketing, they packed up just as the funeral service was beginning.81
Westboro had given law enforcement notice.82 The picketing was peaceful, unamplified,
and confined to a small police-designated area on public land sandwiched between
a public street and church property.83 It was neither seen nor heard during the funeral
service.84 Phelps’s daughters held signs saying: “God Hates You,” “God Hates
America,” “America is Doomed,” “Semper Fi Fags” (with a graphic of stick figures
having sex), “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “God’s View” (with a graphic of Uncle
Sam in cross-hairs).85 Phelps’s grandchildren held signs saying: “You’re Going to
Hell,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “Fag Troops,” “Don’t Pray for the
USA,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Maryland Taliban,”
“Fags Doom Nations,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “Pope in Hell.” All seven wore T-
shirts emblazoned with “God Hates Fags.”86
Snyder commenced a diversity action against Phelps and Westboro,87 and later
added Phelps’s daughters as defendants.88 Three of the state law tort claims—IIED,
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy—survived to a jury trial.89 The jury
returned a verdict for Snyder on all three, awarding $2.9 million in compensatory
damages and $8 million in punitive damages.90 The District Judge reduced punitive
damages to $2.1 million.91 The Fourth Circuit reversed, accepting Westboro’s
argument that the judgment contravened the First Amendment.92
78 Id. ¶¶ 25, 34, 36.
79 Id. ¶ 35.
80 See Isaac Baker & Ari Natter, Group Pickets Across Country, CARROLL CTY. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2006, at 01.
81 See id.
82 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
83 Id. at 448–49.
84 Id. at 460.
85 Id. at 448, 454; Affidavit of Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis at ¶ 126, Snyder v. Phelps, 533
F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (No. 06-CV-1389); Argento, supra note 69, at 01.
86 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448, 454; Argento, supra note 69, at 01.
87 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008).
88 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 210–11 (4th Cir. 2009).
89 See id. at 211.
90 Id.
91 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008).
92 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
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The Supreme Court rejected Snyder’s appeal in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by all except Justice Alito.93 Proceeding on “the unexamined premise
that [Westboro’s] speech was tortious,” Roberts noted that “[t]he Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”94 Making out the defense “turns
largely on whether [Westboro’s] speech is of public or private concern, as determined
by all the circumstances of the case.”95 Speech is of public concern “when it can ‘be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of
general interest and of value and concern to the public.’”96 The Court must examine
the “content, form, and context” of the speech as disclosed by an independent review
of the whole record.97 Roberts gave two examples of speech of purely private concern:
information about a particular individual’s credit report made solely in the personal
interest of the speaker to a small number of subscribers who were bound not to
disseminate; and videos of a government employee engaged in sexual activity.98
Turning to the speech at issue, Roberts held that “[t]he ‘content’ of Westboro’s
signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large.”99 This conclusion
is stated rather than justified. Westboro’s signs, although “fall[ing] short of refined
social or political commentary,” nevertheless highlighted “matters of public import,”
namely, “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate
of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic
clergy.”100 It did not matter that some of the signs could be fairly considered as related
to the Snyders specifically, because “the overall thrust and dominant theme of
Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”101 On form, Roberts held
that the signs conveyed Westboro’s position “in a manner designed . . . to reach as
broad a public audience as possible.”102 And on context, Roberts held that the funeral
setting “cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”103 Roberts
rejected Snyder’s arguments on content, form, and context—for example, that
Westboro’s picketing was simply a pretext for a private, personal attack on Snyder
93 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 446, 461, 463 (2011).
94 Id. at 451, 451 n.2.
95 Id. at 451.
96 Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
97 Id. at 453–54 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
761 (1985)).
98 Id. at 453 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 and City of San Diego, 543
U.S. at 84).
99 Id. at 454 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 759).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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and his family, and that the signs deserved minimal First Amendment protection
because Westboro exploited the funeral as a platform to publicize its message—by
reiterating that Westboro peacefully communicated its sincerely held beliefs on mat-
ters of public concern while lawfully present on public land.104 Westboro’s speech
was therefore “entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment.”105
The remainder of the opinion argued three seemingly unrelated points. First, IIED
is not a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech.106 Rather, “[i]t
was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages,” and “any distress occasioned
by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message con-
veyed.”107 Second, the IIED element of outrageousness is “highly malleable” with
“an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on
the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression.”108 This creates an unacceptable risk that the jury would be
turned into a censor; an outraged jury cannot overcome the First Amendment’s special
protection. Finally, in the only substantive argument dealing with the intrusion upon
seclusion claim, Roberts rejected Snyder’s assertion that he was a member of a captive
audience at his son’s funeral.109 The captive audience doctrine, Roberts explained,
is applied only sparingly. Snyder did not meet his burden of “‘showing that substantial
privacy interests [were] invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,’”110 because
Westboro stayed well away from, and did not interfere with, the memorial service
itself, and Snyder saw no more than the tops of the signs while driving there.111
Justice Breyer’s prudential concurrence emphasized that the Court’s opinion was
narrowly limited to Westboro’s picketing. Although he “agree[d] with the Court’s
conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public concern,” Breyer thought
that more was required.112 After all, a physical assault committed as a means to
broadcast a matter of public concern to a wide audience is not immunized by the First
Amendment, and “in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would
be similarly unprotected.”113 The judicial task, when “First Amendment values and
state-protected (say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict,” is to “review[ ] the
underlying facts in detail.”114 And—just like the Court—Breyer reiterated that
Westboro’s peaceful picketing communicated its sincerely held beliefs on matters
104 Id. at 453–54.
105 Id. at 458.
106 Id. at 457–58.
107 Id. at 457.
108 Id. at 458 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 459–60 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
111 Id. at 460.
112 Id. at 461 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 462.
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of public concern while lawfully present on public land, that the picketing did not
impact the funeral service, and that Snyder only saw the tops of the signs as he drove
there.115 The application of state law would “punish Westboro for seeking to com-
municate its views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing
the State’s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.”116
Justice Alito penned a lonesome dissent. He disagreed “that the First Amendment
protected [Westboro’s] right to brutalize Mr. Snyder.”117 Alito was obviously affected
by Snyder’s “incalculable loss,” and worried that the First Amendment insulated
Westboro from liability for a “vicious verbal assault” that had deprived Snyder the
elementary right of every parent to bury a dead child in peace.118 Alito denied that
the First Amendment is a license to “intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on
private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal
attacks that make no contribution to public debate.”119 Because IIED is “a very narrow
tort”120 that can be satisfied by speech, “[w]hen grave injury is intentionally inflicted
by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not
interfere with recovery.”121 Alito carefully reviewed Westboro’s speech and concluded
that it “specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2)
he was a member of the United States military,”122 and that “this attack, which was
almost certain to inflict injury, was central to [Westboro’s] well-practiced strategy
for attracting public attention.”123 On the one hand, Alito said, “commentary on the
Catholic Church or the United States military constitutes speech on matters of public
concern,” but, on the other, “speech regarding Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct
does not.”124 Alito thought Breyer’s analogy—that a physical assault committed as
a means to broadcast a matter of public concern to a wide audience is not immunized
by the First Amendment—captured the nature of Westboro’s verbal assault here.125
Alito directly engaged the Court’s opinion on three fronts. He argued, first, that
the Court was wrong to conclude that “the overall thrust and dominant theme of
Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broad[ ] public issues.”126 Rather, Westboro’s
specific attack on Matthew was of “central importance.”127 “[I]n any event,” Alito
argued, “I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because
115 Id.
116 Id. at 462–63.
117 Id. at 463 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 464.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 466.
122 Id. at 470.
123 Id. at 466.
124 Id. at 470.
125 See id. at 471.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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it is interspersed with speech that is protected.”128 Second, Alito rejected what he
called the Court’s “suggest[ion] that [Westboro’s] personal attack on Matthew Snyder
is entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not motivated by a private
grudge.”129 Westboro executed a “cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as
a means of attracting public attention,” and its desire to achieve maximum publicity
did not turn a personal attack into a contribution to public debate.130 Third, Alito
contended that the location of the picketing—on public land adjacent to a public
street—should not be dispositive: if otherwise actionable speech grounds IIED
liability, then a public street near a funeral is not “a free-fire zone.”131
II. SULLIVAN V. SNYDER
Sullivan and Snyder are usually placed in the same category of First Amendment
enforcement, because Snyder takes up Sullivan’s mantle to limit state common law
torts according to the constitutional free speech guarantee.132 Since Sullivan, no
tenable First Amendment theory can deny that the First Amendment protects some
speech which would otherwise be actionable under a state’s common law. For ex-
ample, a state’s IIED tort: compensates for injury to state of mind, and is not a “generally
applicable law”; does not involve the injured party’s waiver of First Amendment
rights; can punish for speech of public concern; and can be balanced away when it
restricts speech.133 In a choice between “two radically different ways that the First
Amendment addresses civil liability involving speech—either full First Amendment
protection or virtually none at all”134—Sullivan and Snyder are of the same ilk.
But their modes of First Amendment enforcement are categorically different. This
Part aims to drive a wedge between them. Sullivan is a common law decision. It
started with the Alabama law of libel because that is what the state courts purported
to enforce.135 And, as this Part shows, Sullivan’s primary holding settled a long-
standing common law debate that raged in state courts over the existence of a
128 Id.
129 Id. at 471–72.
130 Id. at 472.
131 Id.
132 See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1658–60 (2009) (explaining that Sullivan’s application
of the First Amendment to state common law had “profound implications” and that the
Supreme Court “expanded the Sullivan rule in defamation law” and “also applied the First
Amendment beyond defamation to a variety of speech torts”).
133 See generally id. at 1672–85 (detailing various theories of First Amendment applica-
bility, including the nature of the injury approach, the generally applicable law approach, the
consensual waiver approach, the public concern approach, and the First Amendment bal-
ancing approach).
134 Id. at 1652.
135 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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conditional privilege in a defamation action for criticism of public officials or candidates
for public office. Brennan quoted extensively from, and modeled his federal rule on,
the leading state court decision supporting the so-called “liberal rule,” which immunized
criticism of public officials and candidates for office.136 Sullivan is a common law
decision because it adopted the internal point of view towards state common law.
Snyder started not with Maryland’s common law, but with the First Amendment.
Roberts announced that the First Amendment provides a public concern defense in
all state tort suits affixing liability to speech.137 Consequently, speech on matters of
public concern (an expansive and elastic category) is not actionable. This Part
demonstrates that since it was decided, state courts have applied Snyder to a wide
range of factual circumstances and to torts beyond IIED. Snyder is absolutist because
its immunization of speech that is arguably of public concern has effectively pre-
empted state common law speech torts. Although courts are required to analyze the
content, form, and context of speech in determining the extent of First Amendment
protection, in reality, content is almost always dispositive.
A. Sullivan: Start with the Common Law
Methodologically, Sullivan is a common law decision. This claim, though simple-
sounding, needs unpacking. Sullivan is a common law decision because Brennan’s
opinion adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama’s common law. Brennan
first held that a state common law rule grounding a jury verdict counts as state action.138
He then adopted the point of view of a state common law court to supply a rule of de-
cision that conformed to the First Amendment.139
1. Looking Behind the Libel Label
The state action point did not receive much airtime in briefing, oral argument,
or Brennan’s final opinion. Wechsler’s brief urged the Court to look behind the libel
label. The brief emphasized that not only the judgment but also the “rule of law” (or
“rule of liability” or “principle of liability”) was state action that is offensive to the
First Amendment.140 In Wechsler’s telling, the Times “challenged a State rule of law
applied by a State court to render judgment carrying the full coercive power of the
State, claiming full faith and credit through the Union solely on that ground.”141 It
136 Id. at 282.
137 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011).
138 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264–65.
139 See id.
140 Brief for Petitioner at 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 42, 49, 58, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39). The pincites refer to expressions like “rule of law” in the
petitioner’s brief.
141 Id. at 39–40.
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was “obvious[ ]” to Wechsler that both “[t]he rule and judgment” were “of course”
state action.142 In a phrase picked up by Brennan, Wechsler said that “libel does not
enjoy a talismanic insulation from the limitations of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”143 Wechsler’s “first proposition” during oral argument was “that this action
was judged in Alabama by an unconstitutional rule of law . . . offensive on its face
to the First Amendment.”144
Brennan accepted this argument almost glibly. He held that the common law rule
was constitutionally deficient due to inconsistency with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.145 Like Wechsler’s brief, Brennan’s opinion referred to the “rule of
law” or “rule of liability”146 as state action to be “measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.”147 “It matters not,” said Brennan, that the “law has been ap-
plied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.”148
What matters is whether state “power has in fact been exercised.”149 The common
law fashioned and applied by the Alabama courts counted as state action that must
yield to the First Amendment.
Having subjected the legal reasons purportedly legitimizing the jury verdict to
First Amendment scrutiny, there were a few options available to Brennan. One was
to throw out the libel tort when wielded by officials as officials, as Wechsler and the
concurrences urged.150 Another was to require the official to prove special damages
(that is, actual or material economic harm).151 A third option was to require the official
to prove the critic’s malice.152 The requirement of malice distinguished between dishonest
statements designed to harm the official and honest yet factually incorrect criticisms.153
Brennan’s famous adoption of an actual malice requirement was characterized
by a striking and unusual engagement with state common law. Thanks to Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins,154 the Supreme Court rarely bothers with the intricacies of state
common law, on which state courts are authoritative. A similar tendency is apparent
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 29. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“[l]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations.”).
144 Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 00:40:55.
145 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
146 Id. at 268.
147 Id. at 264–65, 268–69, 278.
148 Id. at 265.
149 Id.
150 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring), 297–98 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Brief for Petitioner at 51–52, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No.
39); Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 00:41:08.
151 See Brief for Petitioner at 53, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(No. 39).
152 See id. at 53–54.
153 See id. at 54.
154 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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when state statutes present federal constitutional questions. Federal courts are often
reluctant to narrow state statutes to avoid those questions.155 Although arguably erro-
neous, federal courts avoid avoidance in state statutory cases. This approach is driven
by a concern that federal courts lack power to rewrite state statutes if the Constitution
does not affirmatively require it. Rather than decide the question for themselves, the
federal courts often punt to state legislatures or state courts. In Sullivan, the Alabama
law of libel was a mix: a creature of the common law regulated by statute.156 Unusually
in a post-Erie world, Brennan held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments af-
firmatively required that the Alabama law of libel be changed.
2. The Internal Point of View
Put differently, Brennan adopted an internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama
common law. Ordinarily, the Constitution either upholds or invalidates state law. Rather
than narrow, federal courts prefer to veto state statutes. Wechsler and the concurrences
similarly preferred to view the application of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
as a binary operator: before, state officials could bring defamation claims; after, they
could not.157 On this view, the Constitution operates externally to state common law.
But Brennan took a different view. The First and Fourteenth Amendments justified
Brennan adopting an internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama law and modifying
that law to remove the constitutional infirmity.
The distinction between the internal and external points of view of a social group
equipped with rules of conduct was first made by Herbert Hart in 1961. The external
point of view is an attitude towards the rules of the group “as an observer who does
not himself accept them.”158 The internal point of view towards the rules is the attitude
of “a member of the group [who] accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.”159 Hart
illustrated this concept by way of a traffic light on a busy street. The external point
of view, he said, is limited to the view of an observer who says that “when the light
turns red there is a high probability that the traffic will stop.”160 But this “will miss
out a whole dimension of the social life” of the drivers, who adopt the internal point
of view by treating the red light “not merely [as] a sign that others will stop,” but “as
a signal for them to stop, and so a reason for stopping in conformity to rules which
make stopping when the light is red a standard of behaviour and an obligation.”161
The debate over the correct understanding of the distinction between the internal
and the external points of view is alive and well. This is not the place to rehash that
155 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretations: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1948–58 (2011).
156 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
157 See id. at 293, 297–99 (Black, J., concurring).
158 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 90.
161 Id.
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debate. The distinction has been widely adopted (a version of it was deployed by both
Hart and Ronald Dworkin) but no one seems to agree precisely on what it is. Hart
distinguished between the observer and the group member;162 Dworkin between the
sociologist or historian and the participant;163 Shapiro (reconstructing Hart) between
the theoretical and the practical.164 In a skeptical intellectual history, Barzun dis-
tinguished between substantive and methodological varieties of the distinction.165
I’ll focus on the substantive internal point of view, which, as articulated by Shapiro,
is “the practical attitude of rule acceptance,”166 or, according to Barzun, is “the
attitude of someone who accepts a given rule as a guide for his or her conduct.”167
A person “takes the internal point of view towards a rule when one intends to conform
to the rule, criticizes others for failing to conform, does not criticize others for
criticizing, and expresses one’s criticism using evaluative language.”168
Under the Rules of Decision Act,169 federal courts regard relevant state law as
rules of decision, unless federal law requires otherwise. This means that federal judges
take the substantive internal point of view towards state law. They display a practical
attitude of accepting state law: they intend to conform to state law (except where it
is preempted by federal law), criticize other judges if they fail to apply state law cor-
rectly, view the fact of criticism as legitimate, and use evaluative language. But there
are, nevertheless, crucial differences in the expression of the practical attitude of state
law acceptance in federal and state courts. State courts have a legal claim to the status
of ultimate sovereign authority over state law. They make and develop state law. As
a species of the substantive internal point of view, I’ll call this the authorial attitude:
state courts author state law.
Federal courts adopt another species of the substantive internal point of view,
which I’ll call scribal. Thanks to Erie, in the absence of applicable federal law, federal
courts have no authoritative say over the content of state law. When federal courts
162 See id. at 89–90.
163 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13–14 (1986).
164 See Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157
(2006) (distinguishing between two points of view: the practical, which “is that of the insider
who must decide how he or she will respond to the law”; and the theoretical, which “is that
of the observer, who is often, but not necessarily, an outsider, who studies the social behavior
of a group living under law”).
165 Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal
Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015) (summarizing three different internal points of view,
one substantive and two methodological, and arguing that the distinction between the internal
and external perspectives has “proliferated throughout legal theory,” “allowed novel, inter-
disciplinary approaches to studying legal phenomena,” and “offered a sophisticated intellectual
justification for engaging in more traditional, doctrinal forms of scholarship,” but has also
“dodged as many questions as it has answered”).
166 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 1157, 1159, 1161.
167 Barzun, supra note 165, at 1218.
168 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 1163.
169 Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
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apply state law in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and state law has run out, the
federal court can either hazard an Erie guess or, in some instances, certify the ques-
tion to the state supreme court. In a run-of-the-mill case, the federal court ascertains
state law as best it can, seeking to capture and apply state law as it exists, point-in-
time. This scribal attitude thus takes a substantive internal point of view by seeking
a current but static snapshot of state law. And while federal court judges need no
longer “be a ventriloquist’s dummy,”170 it was not until 1991 that the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted de novo rather than deferential review of lower federal court determi-
nations of state law.171 Federal courts are not authors, but scribes of state law.
3. The “Discoursive” Method of the Common Law
Reconstructing a modest and historically minded conception of the common law,
Gerald Postema sensitively theorized some of our platitudinous aphorisms about the
common law: incrementalism, case-by-case adjudication, bottom-up reasoning, and
so on.172 The common law, he argued, “is rooted in a disciplined practice of public
practical reasoning, maintaining a substantial congruence (but not identity) with the
texture of daily life and affairs of members of the political community.”173 For our pur-
poses, there are three aspects of this so-called “artificial reason” that merit highlighting.
The first is that the classical conception of the common law focused on what
Matthew Hale dubbed the “texture of human affairs” and the “conversation between
man and man.”174 In Postema’s reconstruction, “Hale’s use of these two terms ‘texture’
and ‘conversation’ is rich and telling,” because they capture the complexity of “all
the forms of daily social interaction, commerce, and communication that give shape
to human affairs.”175 The aim of the common law judge was “to make concrete
judgments from a comprehensive grasp of the concrete relations and arrangements
woven into the fabric of common life.”176 Judges acquire “the social capacity to make
judgments that even in novel cases one can be confident will elicit recognition and
acceptance as appropriate in one’s community.”177 When interpreting a covenant, for
example, Hale’s judge “sets the words into the context of his understanding of the
concrete commerce of the parties,” and deploys relevant cases and “his understanding
170 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 396 (6th ed.
2002).
171 Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 236 (1991) (“The obligation of respon-
sible appellate review and the principles of a cooperative judicial federalism underlying Erie
require that courts of appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo.”).
172 Postema, Part I, supra note 26; Postema, Part II, supra note 26.
173 Postema, Part II, supra note 26, at 27.
174 Id. at 4.
175 Id. at 4 n.17.
176 Id. at 5.
177 Id. at 9–10.
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of the practice of making sense out of such agreements.”178 The common law crafted
solutions molded to the tangible social relationships between parties, and its credibility
depended on a sensitive, textured understanding of those complex relationships.
Second, the artificial reason of the common law is “discoursive,” because it
constitutes “deliberative reasoning and argument in an interlocutory, indeed forensic,
context.”179 Sound law is “tried and sifted upon disputation and argument” in open
court.180 Hale thought that common law judging “was a distinctively deliberative,
discoursive capacity,” that is, “an ability to articulate and defend judgments publicly.”181
And, on this view, the authority of a common law opinion derives from its surviving
continual contestation in a public forum. A judicial decision claims authority as “the
product of a process of discoursive reasoning and contextually-situated reflective
judgment.”182 According to Hale, a judgment counts as law if it is integrated or in-
corporated into the practice of common law reasoning183: as Postema put it, “[o]nly
through continual use, exposition, interpretation, and extension—through being taken
up and appropriated by practitioners of the common law—was a novel rule or doctrine
made part of the common law.”184 And, through its incorporation into the common law,
a doctrine influences the activities of members of the political community, strengthening
the link between the common law and the complex texture of human experience.
Finally, the common law resisted the canonical formulation of its doctrines. Com-
mon law rules and norms can be reduced to text, argued Postema, “but no such formu-
lation is conclusively authoritative; each is in principle vulnerable to challenge and
revision in the course of reasoned argument and dispute in the public forensic context.”185
Bacon thought that the common law “is not to be sought from the words of the rule,
as if it were the text of the law,”186 and Coke thought that “[t]he reporting of particular
cases . . . is the most perspicuous course of tracing the right rule and reason of the
law.”187 Postema labeled these statements “orthodox common law jurisprudence.”188
We see the threads of this discoursive account of common law jurisprudence at work
today, especially in state courts. State courts view themselves, and distinguish them-
selves from federal courts, as common law courts. Ellen Ash Peters, former Chief
Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, wrote that “[u]nlike the federal courts,
Connecticut courts still function, most of the time, as common law courts, where the
178 Id. at 9.
179 Id. at 7.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 16.
182 Id. at 17.
183 See id. at 13.
184 Id. at 20.
185 Id. at 14.
186 Id. at 6.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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operative principles are more often derived from fact-bound precedents than from
authoritative texts.”189 Similarly, Margaret H. Marshall, former Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, contended, “[t]o an extent virtually unknown
in the federal courts, state court judges are common law judges.”190 “Because we are
deeply rooted in the common law,” argued Marshall, “we are fluent in its cardinal
principle of law’s plasticity,” and the ability of the common law to “adapt[] to changing
realities with a disciplined incrementalism.”191
State courts, because they are common law courts, reflect and influence the day-
to-day activities of, and relationships among, their residents.192 State courts are local
courts, less centralized than their federal counterparts, and in that sense are “closer”
to the people.193 The doctrinal basins of the common law (torts, contracts, property,
and restitution) are located in the states. State common law courts often prefer to solve
problems possessing a constitutional dimension by fashioning a common law rule
that avoids the constitutional difficulty. Their “focus . . . is to fashion workable rules
for a narrower, more specific range of people and situations.”194 “The state courts’
long tradition as common law generalists,” argued Helen Hershkoff, “affords legiti-
macy to this nonconstitutional elaboration of public issues.”195 The absence of a
federal general common law means that the general common law is state law; and
that common law is co-constitutive of the complex texture of human affairs.
In its ideal form, the common law practice of state courts is classically dis-
coursive. For one thing, of course, state courts “regularly borrow from each other,
using good ideas and forms of analysis that lawyers cite in appellate proceedings.”196
State courts are wary of a U.S. Supreme Court that prematurely silences interstate
judicial dialogue when federalizing the common law.197 Moreover, a preference for
189 Ellen Ash Peters, What Are the Locals Up To? A Connecticut Snapshot, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 129, 130
(Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2010).
190 Margaret H. Marshall, State Courts in the Global Marketplace of Ideas, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 153, supra
note 189, at 160.
191 Id.
192 See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (1995).
193 Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 459, 465 (1996); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2067 (2010).
194 Judith S. Kaye, A Double Blessing: Our State and Federal Constitutions, 30 PACE L.
REV. 844, 848 (2010).
195 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (1999).
196 Randall T. Shepard, State Supreme Courts as Places for Litigating New Questions, in
WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 137,
supra note 189, at 150.
197 Marshall, supra note 190, at 162–63.
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crafting common law solutions to avoid constitutional difficulties opens a dialogue
with the state legislature. Judith Kaye, former Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals, noted that common law decisions “leave it open for legislatures to fix
comprehensive standards.”198 Molding common law rules against the backdrop of
constitutional norms “afford[s] the legislature an explicit opportunity to develop
programmatic content.”199 The integrated discourse among a state’s lawmaking insti-
tutions is deep. Ellen Ash Peters observed that “state supreme courts see the creation
of an integrated state jurisprudence, without sharp lines of demarcation between consti-
tutional law, statutory law, and judge made law, as part of our judicial responsibility.”200
And, because state courts are closer to the people and to state legislatures, unac-
ceptable common law is “more readily redressable.”201 Developing common law rules
consistently with constitutional norms increases the likelihood that those rules survive
continual public contestation and are taken up by legislatures and other courts.
4. Sullivan’s Discourse
Armed with the internal point of view to Alabama law, Sullivan adopted the dis-
coursive method of the common law. In the first half of the twentieth century, a debate
raged in state courts over the existence of a conditional privilege to a defamation suit.202
In the mid-1930s, state courts were about evenly split on whether a member of the
public was conditionally privileged to make false and defamatory statements of fact
about public officers and candidates for office.203 To establish a privileged occasion,
the defendant had to show that the speech related to the qualifications of a public officer
or a candidate for office. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the privi-
lege had been abused, that is, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant did not
believe the truth of the statement or did not have reasonable grounds for believing in
its truth. The states recognizing this conditional privilege were said to adhere to the “lib-
eral rule,” because it permitted more public discussion and loosened defamatory restric-
tions; the states rejecting the conditional privilege adhered to the “narrow rule.”204
Kansas, for example, affirmed the liberal rule in a 1908 case, Coleman v.
MacLennan.205 The plaintiff, the state’s attorney-general seeking re-election, sued
198 Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full
Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 745 (1992).
199 Hershkoff, supra note 195, at 1164.
200 Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1070–71 (1998).
201 Kaye, supra note 194, at 848–49.
202 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936) (Note
to Annual Meeting).
203 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 135 (1937) (“The au-
thority is just about evenly divided.”).
204 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936).
205 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
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the owner and publisher of a newspaper for an allegedly defamatory article purporting
to state facts about the plaintiff’s official conduct relating to a school fund trans-
action.206 The trial judge instructed the jury on the conditional privilege, and the jury
found for the defendant.207 Rousseau Burch, for the Kansas Supreme Court, affirmed
the lower court in an interesting and wide-ranging opinion.208 Burch held that anyone
claiming to be defamed by a communication on “matters of public concern, public
men, and candidates for office,” “must show actual malice, or go remediless.”209
Burch noted that “[u]nder a form of government like our own there must be freedom
to canvass in good faith the worth of character and qualifications of candidates for
office.”210 Analogizing from English cases on parliamentary and courtroom privilege,
Burch argued, in a passage made famous by Sullivan, that the importance of the
discussion of the character and qualifications of candidates for office “is so vast and
the advantages derived are so great that they more than counterbalance” any potential
injury to individuals.211
Nearly twenty years after Coleman, the debate over the liberal and the narrow
rules played out at the American Law Institute’s 1937 annual meeting, attended by
Burch and also by Learned Hand.212 The thirteenth tentative draft of the first torts
Restatement adopted the liberal rule, citing Coleman as a leading case.213 This proved
contentious. Fowler V. Harper, the Associate Reporter and a noted torts expert, said
that the state of authority was about evenly divided or “a little bit on the side of the
strict rule.”214 Augustus N. Hand, Learned Hand’s first cousin and, like Learned Hand,
a judge on the Second Circuit, moved to strike the conditional privilege from the
Restatement.215 William Draper Lewis, ALI’s founding director, called it “the most
important question you have in relation to this volume.”216
Burch spoke in favor of the liberal rule. He defended Coleman but was
“extremely reluctant to be in the attitude of the fireman rescuing his own child.”217
Nevertheless, he responded to criticism that the conditional privilege was contrary
to English law, saying, “I have never thought it necessary to roll up the bottoms of
my trousers when it was raining in London.”218 He suggested that the Restatement’s
broad and unchallenged conditional privilege rule—permitting “any one of several
206 See id. at 281.
207 See id. at 281–82.
208 Id. at 293.
209 Id. at 285.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 286.
212 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 2 (1937).
213 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936).
214 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 148 (1937).
215 Id. at 137 (Judge Augustus Hand).
216 Id. (Director William Draper Lewis).
217 Id. at 142–43 (Hon. Rosseau A. Burch).
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persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter” to claim a con-
ditional privilege—would support the liberal rule, just as it supported a conditional
privilege to members of non-profit associations for communications concerning the
qualifications of officers and members.219 The requirement of good faith, “a matter
that is tried every day in all the courts of the country,” ensured that newspapers were
not given a license to defame.220 And he argued that the predicted dangers flowing
from the liberal rule—that it would deter people from running for office and en-
courage outrageous and scandalous press reporting—had not eventuated in Kansas,
where the liberal rule had prevailed for sixty years.221 Burch’s final point was funda-
mental. If an investigation leads to an honest and reasonably founded belief in facts
which turn out to be wrong, Burch asked, “just because somebody is running for
office, that must be suppressed?”222
Burch’s support of the liberal rule pitted him against Learned Hand. Hand started
from the premise that “[t]he elector is not helped by learning false things about a man
who is running for office or who is in office.”223 He embraced the view that there is
no public interest in the discussion of falsehood. For Hand, the problem was one of
burden of proof. If the liberal rule privileged newspapers to publish facts about a
public officer or candidate that turned out to be untrue, then Hand would have no
objection.224 But the burden of showing good faith and that the privilege had not been
abused rests with the injured party. A newspaper “has not got to justify itself” because
“[i]t is enough for it to say this man was running for public office or he was in public
office and then the burden moves to the other side.”225 This burden, Hand argued,
is impossible to discharge. Take, for example, “a great metropolitan paper.”226 How
is an injured party “to burrow into the structure and the management of a great paper
to find out what inquiry they make; whether the editor was moved by a personal
feeling of spite; whether he was sore against the party[?]”227
Hand then suggested that libel is not a very effective control on newspapers. He
drew a distinction between preventing a newspaper from making statements (which
no one could countenance) and making the newspaper liable for its statements. “At
least,” said Hand, libel “gives [the injured person] some money. That is not much.”228
If newspapers are not liable for damages, then “they have a free hand for anything
that they want to say in the heat of a campaign or perhaps when guided by the meanest
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 146.
222 Id. at 147.
223 Id. at 150.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 151–52.
226 Id. at 152.
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of motives.”229 Hand thought that “a most unjust deprivation of remedies to the parties
who are injured.”230 Hand thus supported rejecting the conditional privilege.
Burch briefly responded, arguing that the problems with the burden of proof were
more apparent than real. Relating an anecdote of a libel trial, Burch said that a jury
deciding the question of good faith would find against a defendant who “displayed
a tendency to conceal,” even if the evidence ultimately showed that the defendant was
testifying truthfully.231 A jury would not be satisfied that an untrustworthy defendant
honestly believed facts after making a reasonable investigation. Burch thought that
burden-of-proof difficulties “all wash[ ] out when the parties face the jury and good
faith will appear which will warrant the jury finding one way or the other without
difficulty.”232 This rejoinder was apparently unconvincing. After a little more discussion,
the ALI sided with Hand and rejected the conditional privilege, 98 votes to 22.233
In Sullivan, Brennan held that the First Amendment required the liberal rule—in
other words, the First Amendment resolved the common law question as Burch had
suggested in 1937. Brennan quoted extensively from Coleman, noting that it rep-
resented “[a]n oft-cited . . . like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state
courts,”234 and that “[t]he consensus of scholarly opinion apparently favors the rule
that is here adopted.”235 The “privilege for the citizen-critic of government” was
“required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”236 It is true, of course, that the
privilege established in Sullivan is not precisely coterminous with the liberal rule.
But Brennan went out of his way to draw from state common law. His first draft of
the Sullivan opinion stated that “[s]afeguards have already been devised by state
courts to guard against the risk that the civil action for libel might be a vehicle for
the suppression of protected comment.”237 The liberal rule articulated by Coleman,
Brennan’s first draft continued, “satisf[ies] the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”238 Sullivan, in other words, was sensitive to the states as authorities over their
own common law. Alabama common law was inconsistent with the First Amendment;
looking to sister states for a constitutional answer is, at the very least, state-regarding
and sensitive to the legitimate interests of the states to develop and direct the course
of their own common law.
The course of authority after Sullivan is well known and, after a shaky start, de-
veloped into a stable doctrinal regime.239 In 1977, John Wade said that the developments
229 Id.
230 Id.
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in the law of defamation after Sullivan were “coming about through the traditional
common law technique,” that the Supreme Court was “working out the problems on a
case-by-case basis,” and that “[t]here have been some wrong turns, but they have been
corrected.”240 The Supreme Court’s reform of defamation, said Wade, produced “a much
better system, simplified and workable administratively—and with a better total bal-
ance of interests.”241 The Supreme Court’s extensive reformation of the law of defamation
was “sound and solid,” and “all the signs point to a very fine completed product.”242
B. Snyder: Start with the First Amendment
While Sullivan started with the state’s legal reasons underpinning the jury verdict,
Snyder started with the bare social fact that a verdict is attached to speech. The initial
focus on naked speech in Snyder, rather than state common law, is a methodological
difference that apparently tees up a prodigious value conflict. The modern First
Amendment is defined by its hostility to discretion. But the discoursive method of
the common law plainly embraces discretion in its incremental attempt to reflect and
contribute to the complex texture of daily human interaction. This section shows,
by reference to IIED, that this value conflict is more apparent than real. Then, by
focusing on how state courts have applied Snyder, this section demonstrates that
Snyder is absolutist because it protects speech that is arguably of public concern,
regardless of form, context, factual record, or theory of liability. In sum, Snyder’s
rule is that arguably public speech is always immune.
1. First Amendment Hostility to Discretion
The unstoppable march of the First Amendment is old news. The literature is
awash with First Amendmentisms (expansionism, Lochnerism, consequentialism)
characterizing its uncontrollable spread. One of the engines of this growth is the First
Amendment’s historic and epic hostility to discretion. The intellectual traditions
embodied by the First Amendment view discretion very skeptically. The Supreme
number of critiques appeared in legal scholarship. One criticized Sullivan as leaving “little
opportunity for common-law growth or innovation,” and arguing that “[t]he fifty laboratories
are gone; there is just the United States Supreme Court groping for a rational scheme.” Elaine
W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of Constitutionalizing State
Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 182–83. Some scholars continue to argue that
Sullivan created doctrinal confusion. See, e.g., Tilley, supra note 21, at 1155–60 (arguing that
the Court, in the post-Sullivan dignitary tort cases, “has elegantly articulated the need to balance
speech and dignity,” but “the rules it has promulgated are inconsistent and imprecise”).
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Court zealously embraced this skepticism. It is no exaggeration to say that First
Amendment doctrine views discretion as free speech’s blood enemy.
When used to evaluate speech, words like malice and, especially, offensive and
outrageous give us a bout of First Amendment jitters. “Malice,” said Black in his
Sullivan concurrence, “is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to
disprove.”243 It is “at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss
public affairs.”244 IIED’s outrageousness element fares even worse. Quoting Hustler,
Roberts’s opinion in Snyder stated that outrageousness “is a highly malleable standard
with ‘an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of
a particular expression.’”245 Eugene Volokh thought that “[m]any statements might
be labeled ‘outrageous’ by some judge, jury, university administrator, or other
government actor.”246 If a tort attaches liability to outrageous (whatever that means)
speech, then the First Amendment should step in.
The argument that a word like “outrageous” in a legal standard is malleable and
vague strikes me as obvious and unhelpful. It is obvious because clearly there are
borderline cases of outrageous conduct (following Timothy Endicott and others, let’s
say that a legal standard is vague if there are borderline cases for its application).247
Vagueness in law is very common,248 perhaps even pervasive,249 and officials and
juries impose liability on the basis of vague standards every day (reasonableness is
a prime example). And it’s unhelpful because it proves too much. If the First
Amendment destroyed all vague standards attaching liability to speech, then it would
invalidate all content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations too: there are
borderline cases of content neutrality.
The argument must be that outrageous is so vague a concept that there are no
clear cases of IIED. It is a borderline case every time a court finds that a defendant’s
243 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
244 Id.
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485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
246 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 300.
247 See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 31 (2000) (“An expression is vague
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and that “a borderline case is one in which, even if we do know how tall someone is, we do not
know whether to say that they are tall or not tall”). Without any more context, Endicott might
say that “outrageous” is a “dummy standard,” that is, a requirement that decisionmakers set
a standard. But “if there is a doctrine of precedent, judicial decisions may give a particular
content to a dummy standard.” Id. at 49, 49 n.35.
248 Id. at 1.
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expressive conduct is outrageous. And because outrageousness is all border and no
center, decisionmakers have complete discretion to decide whether expressive conduct
is outrageous. Therefore, IIED is a license to censor. But, as Zipursky argued, this
is “exactly backwards.”250 The outrageousness element of IIED functions not as an
open-ended conferral of arbitrary discretion, but as a significant limitation on liability.
The legal reality is that “IIED is among the most heavily guarded torts.”251 Courts rou-
tinely accept defendants’ arguments that their conduct, “while admittedly inappropri-
ate and hurtful, does not rise to the extraordinary level expected for the tort.”252
It’s wrong to think of IIED as a tort with only an outrageous element. “The tort
is not,” argued Zipursky, “acting outrageously and thereby causing severe emotional
distress.”253 More accurately, “[o]ver decades and even centuries, courts recognized
clusters of cases in the following areas: striking effrontery in dealing with passengers
or guests, vicious practical jokes, gross sexual misconduct and/or stalking, and mis-
handling of the deaths, funerals, or corpses of family members.”254 These classes of
cases are the core or center of IIED, and the tort expands in the usual common law,
incremental way. In determining whether the tort applies to new facts, courts are guided
by the stinginess of the outrageous element, and judges have a large gatekeeping role
to ensure that juries do not run amok. IIED, and its outrageousness element, are not com-
prehensively vague. There are core instances and—like many other legal standards—
there are borderline applications.
Not that any of this is apparent from Snyder, which was indifferent to Maryland’s
common law of torts. It is a remarkable feature of Snyder—a case originating in the
district court’s diversity jurisdiction—that Maryland law is mentioned in passing only
twice.255 The first is a sentence stating the elements of IIED, citing a Maryland Court
of Appeals case from 1977.256 The second is a paragraph on why the outrageousness
element is insufficiently protective.257 The opinion betrayed no effort to decide
whether the outrageousness element actually threatened the First Amendment; instead,
it simply relied on Hustler’s wrong-headed assertion that outrageousness is too
vague.258 Even though IIED had been recognized as a viable tort in Maryland for more
than thirty years,259 Snyder made no effort to find out what “outrageous” means under
Maryland law.
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2018] SILENCING STATE COURTS 31
Snyder’s failure to interrogate Maryland’s IIED tort suggests that it adopted an
external point of view vis-à-vis state law. Without inquiring into the tort-related legal
reasons grounding the jury verdict, or the attitudes or beliefs of the Marylanders who
accept IIED as a practical standard of conduct, the Supreme Court viewed the jury
verdict as a bare social fact offensive to the First Amendment. And this posited a
conflict-of-laws relationship between state common law and federal law. This model
of rule-conflict says that a state common law tort is either consistent or inconsistent
with the First Amendment, and if it is inconsistent it is invalid and superseded by
the Free Speech Clause.260 The state tort, then, must be abandoned in favor of the rule
of decision supplied by the First Amendment. Thus Volokh accurately described Snyder
as holding that “the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort is presumptively
unconstitutional when applied to speech on matters of public concern.”261
Forgive me for thinking it odd to describe a state common law tort as “invalid”
or “unconstitutional,” or as being “struck down.” That is, of course, the appropriate
vocabulary for judicial review of state (and federal) legislation. As a species of law,
legislation is amenable to the valid/invalid binary. But one of the fundamental
differences between judicial and legislative lawmaking is what Joseph Raz called
the “special revisability of judge-made law.”262 The common law may be incre-
mentally revised each time it is litigated. The judicial power to distinguish precedent,
and to modestly amend or develop the common law, means that legislation is more
static than judge-made law. These are general observations of course; nevertheless,
“[i]t is typical of common law rules to be moulded and remoulded in the hands of
successive courts using explicitly or unconsciously their powers of reformulating and
modifying the rules concerned.”263
Snyder, however, equated Maryland’s common law right of action to legislation.
As noted above, the common law since Hale and Coke resists the reduction of its rules
and principles to a canonical text because they are “vulnerable to challenge and
revision in the course of reasoned argument and dispute in the public forensic
context.”264 Treating IIED as reduced to a fixed, canonical text, the Supreme Court
adopted a plain-meaning interpretation of “outrageous,” ignored state common law,
and effectively preempted IIED when applied to speech of public concern. By taking
an external point of view to Maryland’s IIED tort, as though it were statute-like and
invulnerable to change, the Court denied the capacity of a judge to act as an author
of the common law and develop the tort in a way that removes the inconsistency with
the First Amendment.
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2. Seven Years On: Snyder in State Court
The First Amendment’s hostility to discretion is borne out by the important state
court cases that have considered Snyder.265 These cases have not been collected or
analyzed elsewhere, and they are critically important to an appreciation of how state
courts have understood and applied Snyder.266 Snyder framed the question presented
and its holding in terms of “tort liability.”267 It imposed a blanket First Amendment “de-
fense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”268
The Court also included suits for intrusion upon seclusion, although that tort received
even less attention than IIED in the Snyder opinion. Snyder’s reasoning is, therefore,
freely generalizable. Indeed, state courts have adopted the broad, trans-substantive
First Amendment defense. Only the tort of defamation, to which Sullivan and its
progeny directly apply, is resistant to Snyder’s broad sweep.
a. Robin Hooders in New Hampshire
The clearest example of Snyder’s broad sweep comes from New Hampshire,269
where the official state motto is “Live Free or Die.” The City of Keene in south-
western New Hampshire employed three Parking Enforcement Officers (PEOs) to
monitor its downtown parking meters and issue tickets.270 Six of the City’s residents,
who were relatively new Granite Staters and part of a movement called “Free Keene,”
conducted what they called “Robin Hooding”: regularly and closely following and
videotaping the PEOs, identifying expired meters, and refilling them before a ticket
could issue.271 A card would be left on the vehicle’s windshield: “Your meter expired!
However, we saved you from the king’s tariff!”272 They characterized their activity
265 A Westlaw search for “Snyder/5 Phelps” across all state courts produces 89 cases and
24 trial court orders. The cases analyzed here are all the noncriminal opinions that relied on
Snyder’s methodology.
266 Clay Calvert, in an earlier analysis focusing on IIED and media defendants, argued that
lower courts were not limiting Snyder to its facts. See Clay Calvert, Public Concern and
Outrageous Speech: Testing the Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment
Three Years After Snyder v. Phelps, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437 (2014). Calvert’s article was
published before any of the opinions analyzed here were issued.
267 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447 (2011) (“The question presented is whether the
First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.”);
id. at 461 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues
to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro
from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”).
268 Id. at 451.
269 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015).
270 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, Nos.213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241, 2013
WL 8691664, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
271 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 255.
272 Id.; Dan Barry, Libertarians Trail Meter Readers, Telling Town: Live Free or Else,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A1.
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as political protest with an ultimate goal of abolishing parking enforcement because
parking is not a criminal act, the City should not be charging citizens to park, and
parking tickets are a threat against the people.273
On an almost daily basis, the Robin Hooders videotaped and trailed the PEOs,
sometimes about a foot away or so close that if the PEO turned around they would
bump into each other.274 They followed the PEOs on breaks and on their days off.275
They called various PEOs a “fucking thief,” “liar,” “racist,” “bitch,” and “coward.”276
They accused the PEOs of stealing from citizens and of vandalism when the PEOs
chalked tires.277 They suggested that a PEO who was a veteran would “drone brown
babies.”278 This PEO resigned.279 Another PEO contemplated quitting.280 She found
it difficult to focus on her job, she refused to work Saturdays because she felt unsafe,
and she contacted the police on three occasions.281 The third PEO felt intimidated,
and would tense up and become distracted when she heard approaching footsteps.282
Apart from the reduction of staffing hours and loss of ticket revenue, the City also
incurred costs by hiring a private investigator and a therapist.283
The City sued the six Free Keeners in state court for tortious interference with
contractual relations and civil conspiracy, and sought preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief.284 Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the pleadings failed
to state a claim on tortious interference, and that all causes of action violated the free
speech clause of the First Amendment, and Articles 8 (government accountability)
and 22 (free speech) of Part I of the New Hampshire Constitution.285 The City then
filed a separate civil complaint against the same defendants based on the same alleged
facts, which requested a jury trial and sought money damages for tortious interference
and negligence.286
In the Superior Court of New Hampshire, Judge Kissinger, after a three-day
evidentiary hearing, granted the motion to dismiss all claims because they violated
the First Amendment.287 Although “skeptical” that tortious interference could be made
out when private citizens protest government employees, Kissinger nevertheless did
273 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 256.
274 See id. at 257.
275 See id. at 256–57. See also Cleaveland, Nos.213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241,
2013 WL 8691664, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
276 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 256; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *2.
277 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *4.
278 Id. at *4.
279 Id. at *4; Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257.
280 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *3.
281 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *2–3.
282 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *5.
283 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *5.
284 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 255.
285 Id. at 256.
286 Id.
287 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *9.
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not reach the issue because “the enforcement of such a tort is an infringement on the
Respondents’ right to free speech and expression under the First Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”288 In an opinion littered with citations to Snyder, Kissinger
described defendants’ conduct as “speech and expressive protest of the City’s parking
regulation through filling meters, placing cards on windshields, telling the PEOs they
should quit, calling the PEOs ‘thieves,’ ‘fucking thieves,’ and ‘liars,’ and attacking
[a] PEO . . . for his military service.”289 This speech implicates “the political authority
of the City as a sovereign and its regulation of the citizens, as well as the United
States’ military actions abroad,” which “are clearly matters of public concern.”290
The speech “is given special protection because it is at a public place on a matter of
public concern.”291
The tortious interference claim, said Kissinger, could not be characterized as a
“reasonable time, place, or manner restriction” on speech.292 He explained that tortious
interference with contractual relations requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant
intentionally and improperly interfered with an economic relationship between the
plaintiff and a third party.293 Like IIED’s outrageousness requirement, Kissinger thought
that the requirement of improper interference was so subjective as to “create[ ] an
unreasonable risk that the jury will find liability ‘on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.’”294 With
this, Kissinger dismissed the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, denied
injunctive relief, and dismissed the negligence claim.
In the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Justice Bassett affirmed the trial court’s
ruling on tortious interference, but reversed and remanded the denial of injunctive
relief.295 Bassett noted that “we normally address constitutional questions first under
the State Constitution and rely on federal law only to aid in our analysis.”296 Because
the trial court did not address the state constitutional arguments, however, Bassett first
considered the arguments under the federal Constitution.297 Although echoing the trial
288 Id. at *10.
289 Id. at *12.
290 Id.
291 Id. at *13.
292 Id. at *14.
293 Id. at *9–10.
294 Id. at *14 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988))).
295 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and remanded the denial of injunctive
relief because the trial court had not considered all the factual circumstances of the case. The
Supreme Court “express[ed] no opinion as to whether the City’s allegations, if proven, [we]re
sufficient to warrant the trial court’s exercise of its equitable power, or as to whether the par-
ticular injunctive relief requested by the City would violate the Federal or State Constitutions.”
Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 264.
296 Id. at 258.
297 Id. at 258–59.
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court’s skepticism that a tortious interference claim can exist when private citizens
protest the government, Bassett agreed that it was not necessary to reach the issue be-
cause enforcing the City’s tortious interference claim “would infringe upon the re-
spondents’ right to free speech under the First Amendment.”298 His First Amendment
analysis basically tracked the lower court’s, with a similarly large dose of Snyder:
in sum, the First Amendment bars state tort liability attaching to speech of public
concern.
The City did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the content of de-
fendants’ speech was of public concern.299 It did, however, contend that the First
Amendment does not protect specific conduct such as “following closely, chasing,
running after, approaching quickly from behind, lurking outside bathrooms, yelling
loudly, and filming from close proximity.”300 Bassett disagreed. He observed that
a boycott of businesses which causes economic harm and is realized by expressive
conduct (“speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism”) cannot ground an
award of damages.301 Physical violence “is beyond the pale of constitutional protection,”
but peaceful expression on matters of public concern “need not meet standards of
acceptability.”302 The specific conduct targeted by the City was nonviolent and
“intended to draw attention to the City’s parking enforcement operations and to
persuade the PEOs to leave their positions.”303 “[T]he mere threat of tort liability,”
explained Bassett, would have an intolerable chilling effect.304
b. A Police Chase and a Suicide in Arizona
On September 28, 2012, armed with a Glock pistol, JoDon Romero carjacked
a maroon Dodge Caliber in the parking lot of a Phoenix Denny’s.305 He led police
on an hour-long, high-speed chase.306 At first driving east along Interstate 10 for five
miles, Romero made a U-turn, fired his pistol at a police car, and sped west on I-10
for an hour.307 He exited at Tonopah, a “census-designated place” in the Tonopah
Desert near Salome, and eventually turned onto a dirt path before stopping.308 Romero
got out, ran a short distance, fell down, got up, walked through some brush, and
298 Id. at 259.
299 Id. at 260. See also Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691644, at *12.
300 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 260.
301 Id. at 261.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 260.
305 Jessica Testa, Why Did Jodon Romero Kill Himself On Live Television?, BUZZFEED
(May 9, 2013, 10:27 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/why-did-jodon-romero-kill-him
self-on-live-television?utm_term=.tbBOyAJLVj#.yI9kn3XQdA [https://perma.cc/6U6M-R5JL].
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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stopped at a small dirt clearing.309 As police officers approached, Romero put the
pistol to his head, fired, and crumpled to the ground.310
Two helicopters buzzing overhead captured footage of Romero’s suicide. One
belonged to the Phoenix Police Air Support Unit and the other to KSAZ-TV, the Fox
News affiliate in Phoenix.311 The Fox footage aired live during a nationally broadcast
breaking-news program; the ordinary five-second delay for live feeds was not
functioning.312 So, despite the program anchor’s on-air commands to technicians to
“get off” the feed, Romero’s suicide was broadcast live.313
At school, two of Romero’s teenage sons heard that a suicide had been broadcast
on live TV.314 When they got home, they located a clip of the Fox newscast on
YouTube.315 As they watched, they realized that it was their father who had taken
the Dodge at gunpoint and led police on a high-speed chase.316 The boys then saw
footage of their father shooting himself.317
The boys’ mother, Angela Rodriguez, sued Fox on their behalf for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.318 On First Amendment grounds, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit.319
Applying Snyder, Judge Johnsen held that “the Fox broadcast clearly addressed a
matter of public concern.”320 She rejected plaintiff’s argument that although the police
chase was newsworthy, Romero’s suicide was a purely private matter. “Without doubt,”
Johnsen said, “‘the overall thrust and dominant theme’ of the coverage addressed
important matters of public concern.”321 On content, Johnsen explained that “[t]he
public has a strong interest in monitoring the manner in which law enforcement re-
sponds to criminal behavior,” and that Romero “posed an immediate and ongoing
threat to public safety.”322 On form and context, Johnsen noted that the chase and
suicide were broadcast during a news program.323 The footage was not private speech
disguised as a public broadcast.324 The Supreme Court of Arizona denied a petition
for review and the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.325
309 See id.
310 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 356 P.3d 322, 324 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
311 Testa, supra note 305.
312 Id.
313 Rodriguez, 356 P.3d at 324; Testa, supra note 305.
314 Rodriguez, 356 P.3d at 324.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 326.
321 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)).
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 2521 (2016).
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c. A Public School Bus Driver in Wisconsin
Sometime in April 2012, Robert Koebel, a TV reporter employed by Journal Com-
munications, Inc., approached Melissa Dumas in a parking lot, with a camera operator
in tow.326 Through public record requests, Koebel had identified Dumas as a Milwaukee
Public School bus driver who, eight years earlier, had been convicted of misdemeanor
prostitution.327 Koebel was investigating a news story for Milwaukee’s NBC affiliate
about school bus drivers with criminal histories.328 The final story aired footage of
Koebel confronting a visibly shocked Dumas with her mug shot and police report.329
Koebel described “salacious details” from the police report.330 “Koebel also reported
that Dumas had been arrested for ‘drugs and driving on a suspended license,’ and that
Dumas had been in a school bus accident in 2009 when she worked for a different bus
company.”331 The story also showed footage of Koebel interviewing Dumas’s manager
at the bus company.332 The manager said that he had no knowledge of the conviction.333
The broadcast concluded with Koebel noting that Dumas had been dismissed.334
Dumas sued Koebel and his employer, Journal Communications, for invasion
of privacy, IIED, and intentional interference with a contractual relationship.335
Defendants moved to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim because the information
broadcast was a matter of public record.336 The other two claims, they argued, were
barred by the First Amendment.337 Exhibited to defendants’ motion to dismiss was
a video of the broadcast, a transcript of the video published on the internet, and
records relating to Dumas’s arrest and driving history.338 The trial court converted
the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, which it granted on all
claims.339 Judge Curley affirmed for the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.340
Curley first affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, relying on
a Wisconsin statute providing that it is not an invasion of privacy to communicate
any information “available to the public as a matter of public record.”341 There was
no dispute that Dumas’s misdemeanor conviction is a matter of public record. And
326 Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319, 321–22 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
327 Id.
328 Id. at 321.
329 Id. at 322.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 322–23.
339 Id. at 323.
340 Id. at 319–20.
341 Id. at 325 (applying WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(c) (2011–12)).
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Curley rejected Dumas’s contention that her name is not a matter of public record,
relying on precedent holding that “the public has a right to know the names of the
individuals who are driving their children to and from school.”342
Relying almost exclusively on Snyder, Curley noted that “[t]he Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits,”343 and
held that “[i]f we determine that the allegedly tortious speech is a matter of public
concern, we must grant summary judgment on the tort claims alleged.”344 Curley
concluded that although defendants’ broadcast was “undoubtedly embarrassing” to
Dumas, it was nevertheless a matter of public concern entitled to full First Amendment
protection.345 On content, Curley observed that although parts of the story publishing
Dumas’s history were “salacious,” “it did highlight a matter of public import: whether
such a history should have prohibited an individual from working as a school bus
driver.”346 On context, Curley said that “Koebel confronted Dumas in public and asked
her questions about public information, and Dumas did not allege any facts showing that
she had a preexisting relationship with either Koebel or Journal Communications that
would suggest a veiled attempt at a private attack.”347 And on form, Curley dismissed
Dumas’s challenge to “the way in which Koebel confronted her,” simply saying that it
was “clear . . . that any surprise, embarrassment, and indignation arose from the content
of Koebel’s speech.”348 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied a petition for review.349
d. A Disappearance in Connecticut
Nearly fifteen years ago, Billy Smolinski, Jr., disappeared from his home in
Waterbury, Connecticut.350 Nobody can say what happened to him. Billy had asked his
next-door neighbor to walk his German shepherd “because he was travelling north to
look at some cars.”351 But when his parents went to his house the next day, Billy’s truck
was parked in the driveway with his wallet and keys inside.352 Theories swirled. Billy’s
mother and sister, convinced that his ex-girlfriend Gleason knew more than she would
say, applied pressure.353 They disparaged Gleason to her friends.354 They posted many
342 Id. at 325–26 (quoting Atlas Transit, Inc. v. Korte, 638 N.W.2d 625, 633 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001)).
343 Id. at 326 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011)).
344 Id. at 327.
345 Id.
346 Id. at 328.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Dumas v. Koebel, 848 N.W.2d 859 (Table) (2014).
350 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 927 (Conn. 2015).
351 Alexander Nazaryan, Billy Smolinski, Gone Since 2004, Is Part of a ‘Silent Mass Dis-
aster,’ NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:05 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/15/billy
-smolinski-gone-2004-part-silent-mass-disaster-263142.html [https://perma.cc/DE3V-WF29].
352 Id.
353 See Gleason, 125 A.3d at 927.
354 Id.
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missing person flyers depicting Billy along Gleason’s school bus route (Gleason
worked as a school bus driver) and near Gleason’s home.355 After noticing that Gleason
and a friend were tearing down some posters, Billy’s mother and sister followed Gleason
and videotaped her activities.356 Eventually Gleason went to the police station, where
Billy’s mother and sister followed, and a confrontation occurred.357
Gleason sued Billy’s mother and sister for defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.358 The trial court awarded damages on both counts, as well as
punitive damages, but no First Amendment argument was preserved at trial.359 On
appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court rejected defendants’ contention, based on
Snyder, that a First Amendment violation had deprived them of a fair trial.360 The
Appellate Court credited the trial court’s finding that defendants’ placement of posters
was targeted specifically at plaintiff, intended to “break” her into providing defendants
with information.361 The Appellate Court held that, although the posters did not name
the plaintiff, “the context and placement of the posters was designed to ‘hound’ the plain-
tiff into providing . . . information . . . rather than to raise a matter of public concern.”362
The Connecticut Supreme Court, on defendants’ appeal, reversed the Appellate Court
and held that defendants’ conduct was protected by the First Amendment.363 Justice
Robinson first reviewed Snyder at length,364 and then turned to “an examination of
the objective nature of the speech at issue . . . namely, the defendants’ extensive cam-
paign of missing person posters.”365 On content, Robinson held that “matters pertaining
355 Id.
356 Id. at 929.
357 Id. The Connecticut Superior Court, the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court all
discussed: the origins and nature of Billy’s relationship with Gleason; an alleged love triangle;
the demise of the relationship between Billy and Gleason two days before Billy’s disappear-
ance; Billy’s reaction; and the foundations for Billy’s family’s suspicion of Gleason. The trial
judge summed it up: “The facts of this case are distressing. Two sets of basically decent
people found themselves in conflict and involved in a series of mutually antagonistic events
because of a tragic event—the disappearance and apparent death of a young man with his
whole life ahead of him.” Gleason v. Smolinski, No. NNH-CV-06-5005107-S, 2012 WL
3871999, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012).
358 Gleason also sued Billy’s mother and sister for invasion of privacy and tortious inter-
ference with business relationships and expectancies. The invasion of privacy claim wasn’t
successful at trial and Gleason didn’t appeal. The tortious interference claim didn’t make it
to trial. Id. at *1.
359 Id. at *17.
360 Gleason v. Smolinski, 88 A.3d 589, 597–99 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). The standard under
Connecticut law for prevailing on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial in-
cludes a requirement that “the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.” Gleason, 125 A.3d at 930 n.10.
361 Gleason, 88 A.3d at 599.
362 Id.
363 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 960 (Conn. 2015).
364 Id. at 938.
365 Id.
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to missing persons” are of public concern.366 Because the flyers solely sought in-
formation about Billy and did not name the plaintiff, their content related to a matter
of public concern.367
Robinson agreed, at least in principle, with the Alaska Supreme Court in Greene
v. Tinker368 that Snyder is “not an all-purpose tort shield,” and he rejected the “sweeping”
argument that “speech involving a matter of public concern is inactionable.”369 He
explained, however, that “the existence of preexisting animus . . . does not necessarily
render the messages conveyed . . . matters of purely private rather than public con-
cern.”370 Defendants’ intention to “hound” plaintiff until she “broke” did not remove
First Amendment protection because “the targeted content and location” of the flyers
“was consistent with the overarching public concern of gaining information about
Bill’s disappearance.”371 Robinson distinguished the flyers here from the picketing
signs in Snyder because the signs “referred, at least obliquely, to Snyder.”372 He also
pointed out that the flyers “were placed on or adjacent to public roadways,” and
therefore entitled to heightened First Amendment protection.373
Interestingly, Robinson said that he was “[g]uided heavily” by Cleaveland because
it “considered similarly targeted and harassing conduct.”374 The New Hampshire Supreme
Court, explained Robinson, thought it relevant that the challenged conduct was non-
violent, took place on public streets and sidewalks, and was intended, at least in part,
to persuade the PEOs to quit their jobs.375 Similarly, defendants’ conduct here was “in-
tended to persuade [plaintiff] with regard to a matter of public concern as in Cleaveland,”
and it was not intended to “merely torture her gratuitously with regard to a purely private
matter.”376 The defendants’ “ill-motivated flyer campaign,” therefore, was protected by
the First Amendment.377 Rather than direct judgment as a matter of law, Robinson
ordered a new trial, because the lower courts ignored defendants’ other harassing
conduct—calling the plaintiff offensive names, following her, and videotaping her—
which “might well be held to furnish an independent basis” for plaintiff’s IIED claim.378
Defendants also appealed the trial court’s defamation verdict. The trial court
found three statements by defendants to be defamatory, which together conveyed the
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 332 P.3d 21 (Ala. 2014).
369 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 939 (quoting Greene, 332 P.3d at 34–35).
370 Id. at 939 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
371 Id. at 940.
372 Id. at 942.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 944.
375 Id. at 942–44 (citing City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015)).
376 Id. at 944.
377 Id. at 945.
378 Id. at 944–45.
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imputation that plaintiff or someone in her family murdered Billy, and that plaintiff
knew where Billy was buried.379 Robinson acknowledged that, beyond the common law,
“there are numerous federal constitutional restrictions that govern the proof of the tort
of defamation,” which depend on the status of the plaintiff (public or private figure) and
the subject of the speech (public or private concern).380 The parties did not dispute that
the statements were of public concern and that plaintiff was a private figure. Robinson,
therefore, viewed the inquiry as a question of “the law governing the proof of defamation
claims . . . made by private figure plaintiffs, but relating to matters of public concern.”381
Relying on a straightforward application of Gertz,382 Robinson rejected de-
fendants’ argument that a private figure plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant acted with actual malice in making an allegedly defamatory
statement on a matter of public concern.383 Rather, Robinson held that in such a case
the “defamatory statements must be provably false, and the plaintiff must bear the burden
of proving falsity.”384 But “neither the trial court nor the Appellate Court ever expressly
considered whether the plaintiff proved the falsity of the defamatory statements,”
giving rise to a First Amendment violation.385 Also to no avail was plaintiff’s reliance
on the trial court’s finding of actual malice; Robinson held that the record did not
support such a finding.386
Justice Eveleigh’s dissent, joined by one other justice, denied that the First
Amendment protected defendants’ conduct.387 Eveleigh agreed that the flyers’ content,
“without more, ostensibly relates to a matter of public concern.”388 But he argued that
the flyers’ context and form showed otherwise. Eveleigh centered on what he called
the trial judge’s “crucial” and “critical” factual finding: defendants’ targeted place-
ment of posters served no purpose beyond harassing the plaintiff and expressed no
protected message.389 The majority, argued Eveleigh, overturned this factual finding
sub silentio, without locating clear error as Connecticut law required.390 Instead, the
majority substituted its own factual finding—that “the targeted content and location
was consistent with the overarching public concern of gaining information about
Bill’s disappearance”391—absent a prerequisite ruling that the trial judge had clearly
379 See id. at 946.
380 Id. at 947–48.
381 Id. at 954.
382 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
383 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 954–55.
384 Id. at 956 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
385 Id. at 957.
386 Id. at 957–58.
387 Id. at 960 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting).
388 Id. at 963.
389 Id. at 961–62.
390 Id. at 961.
391 Id.
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erred. This was all the more troubling, according to Eveleigh, because the majority
disregarded the trial judge’s credibility determinations.392
Bound by the trial judge’s factual findings, Eveleigh emphasized three features
of the speech at issue. First, the speech was “uttered in a context that consists of the
sole and exclusive desire to harm the plaintiff and, concomitantly, no intent to convey
a protected idea or message to the public.”393 Second, the speech “is inextricably linked
to intimidating conduct that borders on harassment of a private party on a purely
private matter.”394 And third, holding defendants liable would “not chill protected
speech or pose a risk of self-censorship.”395 No case, argued Eveleigh, has conferred
First Amendment protection on speech meeting these three criteria, even if the speech
contained “facially acceptable content expressed in a traditional public forum.”396
Eveleigh distinguished both Cleaveland and Snyder. Cleaveland was distinguish-
able on two grounds. The first “critical difference” was that Cleaveland involved
“harassing activity that, as a matter of fact, was inextricably linked to, and intended
to advance, [a] protected message to the public—a message protesting the govern-
ment.”397 But here, defendants’ conduct “was not a bona fide expression to the public
of a message that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects.”398 In other contexts, defendants’
message would be protected. But defendants’ admission that their only purpose was
to harass the plaintiff “formed the basis of the trial court’s credibility determination
that this conduct was merely and solely tortious conduct directed at a private party
in an antagonistic, private dispute.”399 Second, a judgment for money damages would
not chill protected speech here. Defendants in Cleaveland “would be penalized for
expressing [their] message,” and others “would think twice and potentially self-
censor.”400 But a judgment against defendants here would “not penalize the defendants
for searching for Bill or bringing their grievances about the authorities’ lack of diligence
to public light.”401 Instead, it would prevent people “from targeting, intimidating,
harassing, and intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon any person they believe
to have previously engaged in the commission of a crime.”402
As for Snyder, according to Eveleigh, “it was the content of the speech—the honestly
believed, protected message that the defendants in Snyder wished to communicate to
the public—that caused the distress, not the context in which the speech occurred.”403
392 Id. at 965–66.
393 Id. at 969.
394 Id.
395 Id.
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397 Id. at 970.
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Here, however, plaintiff’s distress “resulted solely from the context in which the
speech occurred—the relentless hounding of the plaintiff where she lived and
worked—not the content of the posters.”404 Moreover, a judgment here would “not
pose any risk of having resulted from differing tastes or views on what the posters
conveyed or the ideas they espoused, nor does it pose a risk of suppressing unpleasant
expression.”405 Rather, it would impose liability for defendants’ continued and
aggravated conduct which hounded the plaintiff for the sole purpose of intimidation
and harassment.
e. A History of Animosity in Alaska
Only one state court case considering the application of Snyder in detail has
resisted its broad sweep. But its primary reason for refusing to apply Snyder was that
the cause of action was defamation; only as an afterthought did it repeat the false
slogan that Snyder is limited to its particular factual record.406
Distantly related, and hailing from the Alaskan community of Pilot Station, Beverly
Tinker and Karen Greene (and their respective families) had “a history of animosity.”407
In 2007, Tinker, who worked at the Pilot Station Health Clinic, “improperly accessed
Greene’s medical file.”408 After Greene filed a complaint about the incident with the
clinic operator, Tinker was reprimanded and directed to participate in a confidentiality
education program or lose her job.409 The clinic operator also directed Tinker never
to access Greene’s file again.410
It got messier in 2011. In February, when Greene was in the early stages of
pregnancy, she visited the health clinic.411 Greene asked a staff member to ensure
that Tinker would not learn of the pregnancy and due date.412 In addition to her concerns
about Tinker’s prior misconduct, Greene wanted to keep the pregnancy private be-
cause of an earlier miscarriage.413 Soon enough, Tinker told the staff member of
Greene’s pregnancy and the due date.414 The staff member duly informed Greene,
who confronted Tinker at the clinic and filed a second complaint with the clinic
operator.415 It turned out, however, that Tinker was informed of Greene’s pregnancy
“through a gossip chain that began with Greene herself.”416
404 Id. at 973.
405 Id.
406 See Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 35 (Alaska 2014).
407 Id. at 25.
408 Id.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 25–26.
416 Id. at 26.
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Receiving no response to her second complaint, Greene took the matter to the
Pilot Station Traditional Council.417 Greene “attended several meetings of the tribal
council, which according to Tinker was dominated by members of Greene’s extended
family.”418 At one meeting Greene read a letter accusing Tinker of violating confi-
dentiality.419 An investigation by the clinic operator eventually revealed that Greene’s
second complaint was unsubstantiated.420
Tinker sued Greene for defamation.421 Greene counterclaimed.422 Both parties
“sought damages, including punitive damages,” and attorney’s fees.423 During pretrial
motion practice, the trial court rejected Greene’s argument that the alleged disclosures
by Tinker were a matter of public concern, so that Greene had an absolute privilege
to complain about them.424 The trial court explained that “three instances of discussion
in an arguably public forum such as the Pilot Station [Traditional] Council do not
transmute one’s complaints about a specific individual’s actions into a public concern.”425
Instead of an absolute privilege, the trial court held that Greene “had a conditional
privilege to make defamatory statements about Tinker.”426 The question for the jury
was whether Greene had abused her conditional privilege, and the trial court instructed
the jury accordingly. The jury awarded Tinker one dollar in nominal damages.427
Greene appealed the trial judge’s legal rulings on conditional privilege and the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.428 Chief Justice Fabe thought that Sullivan repre-
sented a “major departure” from the common law of defamation.429 Fabe then discussed
the extension of Sullivan to public figures and explained, relying on Gertz, that “the
First Amendment imposes only the most minimal restrictions on state-law liability
in defamation actions brought by private individuals.”430 For private figure defamation
actions, Alaska precedents had not yet determined whether actual malice was required
or whether negligence sufficed.431 Fabe at least hinted that the trial court may have
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 27.
421 Tinker also sued Greene for intentional interference with contractual relations, but
abandoned that claim. Id.
422 Greene’s counterclaims were for invasion of privacy and abuse of process. Id. The trial
court entered a directed verdict on abuse of process, and the jury found Tinker not liable for
invasion of privacy. Id. at 30.
423 Id. at 27.
424 Id. at 28.
425 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
426 Id.
427 Id. at 24.
428 Id. at 36.
429 Id. at 33.
430 Id. at 34.
431 Id. at 34. See also id. at 34 n.43.
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been overprotective, because it instructed the jury as though Tinker were a public
figure who was required to show actual malice.432
Greene argued at length that, after Snyder, “speech involving a matter of public
concern is inactionable.”433 Fabe was having none of it: “the First Amendment is not
an all-purpose tort shield, and Snyder did not change this.”434 She thought that “it
requires some hard squinting to read Snyder as creating such a sweeping rule.”435
Snyder, Fabe announced, “contains no indication that the Court intended to depart
at all—much less depart dramatically—from its carefully drawn defamation prece-
dents.”436 And, of course, “the Court explicitly limited its holding in Snyder to the
facts before it.”437 The major factual difference was that Snyder involved a demonstration
on public land adjacent to a public street,438 whereas “Tinker’s defamation claim was
based entirely on Greene’s complaint to Tinker’s supervisor.”439
3. Snyder Is Absolutist
These cases leave little doubt that, certainly outside defamation, state courts have
wholeheartedly embraced Snyder even at the expense of their own common law. It
is easy to see why: Snyder’s reasoning is freely generalizable. Rather than limiting
its reasons to the Maryland IIED tort, Snyder is expressed in terms of “tort lia-
bility.”440 The major premise of the Court’s opinion is that the “Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits,” and its minor
premise is merely that IIED is one of those torts.441 The only court to have denied
a broadly stated First Amendment defense to a state tort is the Alaska Supreme Court,
but in that case the cause of action was defamation, to which Sullivan and its progeny
directly applied.
The similarities between Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Snyder and Black’s
absolutist concurrence in Sullivan are instructive and striking. Black would have held
that the First Amendment does not merely limit state libel laws but completely
432 See id.
433 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
434 Id. at 35.
435 Id. at 34.
436 Id.
437 Id. at 35.
438 See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
439 Greene, 332 P.3d at 35. Fabe also dealt with analogous arguments under the Alaska
Constitution’s free speech guarantee. See id. at 35–36.
440 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 447 (“The question presented is whether the First Amendment
shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.”). Id. at 461 (“As
a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability
for its picketing in this case.”).
441 Id. at 451.
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prohibits a state’s power to award damages to public officials against critics of their
official conduct. Black’s thoughts on Brennan’s actual malice requirement parallel
Roberts’s on outrageousness. “Malice,” argued Black, “is an elusive, abstract concept,
hard to prove and hard to disprove.”442 It is “at best an evanescent protection for the
right critically to discuss public affairs.”443 Just as Roberts observed that “[a]s a
Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate,”444 so Black thought that “[t]his Nation” cannot
“live in freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically or financially for
criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials.”445 Black could have been
summarizing the Snyder holding when he concluded that “[a]n unconditional right
to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum
guarantee of the First Amendment.”446
Snyder is absolutist.447 Its conception of the First Amendment precludes state
common-law tort liability attaching to speech whose content is of public concern,
irrespective of context, form, factual record, and basis of liability. To sum up the state
court use of Snyder—despite judicial protestations to the contrary—speech whose
content is of public concern is not actionable. Defamation is a significant exception.
But the important state court cases applying Snyder demonstrate its absolutism. They
show that Snyder’s two purported limitations are not real: first, the content-form-
context trilogy is dominated by content alone, and second, Snyder’s avowed factual
narrowness is a tepid limitation.
First, despite judicial assurances that no one element of the content-form-context
trilogy is dispositive,448 it turns out that content is dispositive and a circumstantial
analysis generally changes nothing. Consider the two state cases where context and
form mattered most: Cleaveland and Gleason. In Cleaveland, the targeted harassment
of the PEOs, which included personal insults, was insufficient to deny First Amend-
ment protection to speech whose content was of public concern.449 And in Gleason,
defendants covered telephone poles at plaintiff’s home and work with flyers relating
442 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
443 Id.
444 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 461.
445 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
446 Id.
447 First Amendment “absolutism” is associated with Justice Hugo Black’s insistence that
the First Amendment “says ‘no law,’ and that is what I believe it means,” Edmond Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554
(1962), “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases,’” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
448 “In considering content, form, and context,” Roberts said in Snyder, “no factor is
dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech.” Snyder, 562
U.S. at 454.
449 See City of Keane v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 260 (N.H. 2015).
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to her former lover’s unexplained disappearance—concededly for the sole purpose
of hounding and breaking the plaintiff.450 As the Cleaveland court acknowledged,
prompted by Snyder, absent actual physical violence, the context and form of the
speech is irrelevant.451 And the Gleason court held that so long as targeted, public
harassment is “consistent with the overarching public concern”452 of the speech, then
the First Amendment insulates the speaker from tort liability.453
In the result, an expansive conception of public concern shields a speaker from
tort liability that would otherwise attach.454 True, there are some qualifications: if
there is physical violence, for example, or if the speech constitutes personal har-
assment out of public view. But sustained personal vilification in a public place is
protected by the First Amendment, so long as there is a connection between the content
of the speech and a matter of public concern. As Daniel Solove and Neil Richards
anticipated in their important work on free speech and civil liability, this approach
“provides too broad a scope of First Amendment protection.”455
Second, Snyder’s promise that its “holding . . . is narrow,” and that its “reach . . .
is limited by the particular facts,”456 has been honored only in the breach. In light of
the dominance of content in the content-form-context trilogy, the factual record is rela-
tively unimportant. Identifying the content of speech is a rarely contested issue of fact;
but whether that content is of public concern is an oft-contested question of law. Simi-
larly, the location of speech is a question of fact, but it is not a nuanced factual inquiry;
and it suffices for First Amendment protection if the speech is in public view (or even
better, located on or adjacent to a public street). And the location of speech when broad-
casting images is not the same as the location of events depicted by those images.
Rodriguez shows that the public broadcast of events not in public view (for example,
a suicide in the remote Arizonan desert) nevertheless counts as speech in public view.457
In sum, peaceful speech in public view whose content is of public concern is protected.
This factual inquiry—identifying the content, location, and violence of the speech
at issue—does not ordinarily require a developed record. Indeed the irrelevance of
450 See Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 940, 940 n.20 (Conn. 2015).
451 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 260.
452 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 940.
453 See id.
454 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974), Justice Powell argued
that the public concern test, which Snyder embraced, would overly restrict a state’s legitimate
interest in enforcing a legal remedy for defamation of a private individual. “And,” Powell
argued, “it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’
and which do not—to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, ‘what information is
relevant to self-government.’” Id. at 346 (citation omitted). Powell “doubt[ed] the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience of judges.” Id.
455 Solove & Richards, supra note 132, at 1683.
456 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
457 See Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 356 P.3d 322, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
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the factual record is confirmed by the procedural posture of the state cases applying
Snyder. Rodriguez was determined on a motion to dismiss—that is, on the pleadings
prior to fact discovery.458 The Court consciously decided to “address Fox’s consti-
tutional defense” to “avoid a ‘prolonged, costly, and inevitably futile trial.’”459 Similarly,
in Dumas, a motion to dismiss filed prior to discovery (converted to a motion for
summary judgment because it exhibited a video and transcript of the broadcast and
records relating to Dumas’s arrest and driving history) terminated the litigation.460
The tort claims in Gleason went to trial, but the First Amendment was only raised
on appeal.461 Only in Cleaveland—terminated on a motion to dismiss but after a three-
day evidentiary hearing—did the trial court decide the First Amendment issue on a
relatively developed factual record.462 The clear tendency is that in cases applying
Snyder, much of the factual record is simply irrelevant to the First Amendment inquiry.
The incapacitation of the jury is an obvious corollary of the irrelevance of the
factual record. Snyder went out of its way to justify jury distrust: a jury may not, said
Roberts, “impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or . . . on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression.”463 Scholars have supported the distrust
of the jury to properly enforce the First Amendment. In 1970, Henry Monaghan con-
tended that, “[i]n general, any expansive conception of the jury’s role is inconsistent
with a vigorous application of the First Amendment.”464 Even though Sullivan preserved
a role for the jury in principle, Monaghan noted that Brennan refused to remand the
case against the New York Times back to the hostile state courts and juries.465 More
recently, Eugene Volokh argued that “[m]any statements might be labeled ‘outrageous’
by some judge, jury, university administrator, or other government actor.”466
There is, of course, real reason to worry that juries might fail to vigorously enforce
the First Amendment. But why can’t this distrust be averted in the usual way, by proper
jury instructions? Snyder does not explain. And Snyder ignored the possibility that the
First Amendment could be enforced by requiring the bench to decide the “outrageous”
element. Neither juries nor judges, apparently, can be trusted to decide whether speech
is “outrageous” (Snyder)467 or “improper” (the trial judge in Cleaveland).468 Guided
by the judicial articulation of innumerable other “highly malleable” and “inherent[ly]
458 See id. at 324.
459 Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
460 See Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
461 See Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 928 (Conn. 2015).
462 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 256, 258 (N.H. 2015).
463 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
464 Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 527
(1970).
465 See id. at 527 n.37, 528.
466 Volokh, supra note 246, at 300.
467 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
468 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 258 (N.H. 2015).
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subjective[]” legal standards,469 juries have been deciding such questions for centuries.
Whether conduct is reasonable or reckless—that is the bread and butter of the modern
jury. But whether speech is outrageous—nope. At the risk of repetition, it is true that
the role of the jury has been justifiably limited in many contexts. It is true, too, that
the First Amendment evolved long ago from a guarantee of “protection of the people
collectively from unrepresentative government” to the “protection of currently un-
popular ideas from a current majority.”470 Snyder, however, did not adequately explain
its scope, and ignored open alternatives (proper instructions or judicial determination
of the problematic element). Notice also that Greene v. Tinker, the Alaskan defamation
case applying Sullivan, preserved a role for the jury consistently with the First Amend-
ment (the question for the jury was whether the conditional privilege had been abused).471
The net result is that Snyder enforced an absolutist First Amendment, notwith-
standing the solemn curial pledges that Snyder is a narrow decision. The application
of the First Amendment to state speech torts fixes on a small number of discrete and
rarely contested facts. In reality, one factual finding—the content of the speech—is
a simple predicate that swings open the wide First Amendment door.
III. SULLIVAN, NOT SNYDER
This Part argues that Sullivan’s methodology should be preferred over Snyder’s,
because Sullivan embraced cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan’s model of First
Amendment enforcement has underwritten fifty years of productive state-federal judicial
dialogue. In just seven years, Snyder has suppressed every significant opportunity
for intersystemic conversation. One of Sullivan’s unheralded virtues, then, is that it
created the right conditions for a genuinely cooperative judicial federalism.
A. Cooperative Judicial Federalism
Cooperative judicial federalism goes by various names in the scholarship: dialec-
tical,472 interactive,473 polyphonic474 or relational federalism,475 or intersystemic476 or
469 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
470 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 242
(1998). See also Monaghan, supra note 464, at 527–29.
471 Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 28, 30 (Alaska 2014).
472 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046–47 (1977).
473 Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study
in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 864 (1985).
474 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS 7 (2009).
475 Charleton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a
Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 511, 512 (2011).
476 Gluck, supra note 155, at 1906.
50 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
interjurisdictional477 adjudication. The broad thrust of this literature is that federal-
state judicial dialogue is valuable, and that Erie did not foreclose that dialogue.
Concurrent jurisdiction creates opportunities for cooperative judicial federalism,
because both state and federal courts are authorized to decide the same legal ques-
tions. A court of one system often decides a question arising under the laws of the other.
Although federal courts are not authoritative on questions of state law, there is
nevertheless real room for intersystemic conversation when they interpret state
statutes and constitutions.478
The scholarship says that dialogue between federal and state courts is valuable.
In a seminal work on dialectical federalism, Cover and Aleinikoff argued that the
development of criminal procedure doctrine is “a conversation among equals,” which
“demonstrate[s] a remarkable breadth of views and concerns,” has “a profound impact
on the development of constitutional law,” and “may be justified because it articulates
a basic tension in our society’s view of the criminal process.”479 Similarly, Gluck
invites us to “imagine the possibilities” were statutory interpretation methodology
to be given stare decisis effect.480 Courts would be encouraged to experiment with
their statutory interpretation methodology, creating “a realistic possibility for cross-
systemic pollination of interpretive theory.”481 Of course, federal-state judicial dialogue
was commonplace before Erie, because general common law was a legitimate source
that both state and federal judges could interpret and develop.482
Cooperative judicial federalism should flourish particularly when state rights of
action embed federal issues, or federal rights of action embed state issues. Because
these cases generate questions of state and federal law, they present real opportunities
for state and federal courts to engage in productive dialogue, to respond to each
other’s opinions, and to shape the contours of their own (and each other’s) law,
ensuring state law compliance with federal commands. As Martin Redish argued,
“both state and federal systems have much to gain from institution of a dialogue
between the courts of both systems,” especially when state and federal law can’t be
easily separated.483
Enforcing the First Amendment against state torts therefore presents an oppor-
tunity for cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan and Snyder both deployed the First
Amendment to set aside a jury verdict underwritten by state law. They both required
that a state’s common law speech tort embed a mandatory First Amendment issue.
477 Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World,
in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 103
(James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2011).
478 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 474, at 102; Gluck, supra note 155.
479 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1055, 1065–66.
480 Gluck, supra note 155, at 1992.
481 Id.
482 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1048 n.66.
483 Redish, supra note 473, at 901.
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But the similarities stop there. Sullivan seized the opportunity for cooperative judicial
federalism; Snyder spurned it. In the following decade, state courts absorbed Sullivan
and its progeny into the specifics of their common law.484 This process epitomizes
cooperative judicial federalism because the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement
made “much room for federal-state dialogue.”485 But Snyder paid almost no attention
to state law, leaving no breathing space for federal-state dialogue. Snyder’s absolutism,
part and parcel of the First Amendment’s unstoppable march, shut down the articu-
lation of state law and with it the possibility of federal-state judicial dialogue.
B. The Common Law and Cooperative Judicial Federalism
Why did the Sullivan paradigm for enforcing the First Amendment against state
common law torts generate a cooperative judicial federalism? Sullivan’s inauguration
of cooperative judicial federalism is partly (and inseparably) about the role and status
of the common law in the United States. In “Our Federalism,”486 the common law
is primarily located in the states. This is a consequence of two facts: first, Henry
Hart’s celebrated axiom that federal law is “interstitial in its nature,” designed to achieve
a specialized or targeted purpose;487 and second, Brandeis’s famous declaration in
Erie that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”488 These are not absolutes, but
they resonate when the First Amendment limits state common law torts. In effect,
Sullivan imposed an affirmative duty on state and federal judicial officers in some
common law cases. Snyder imposed a congruent affirmative duty too; that duty,
however, ignores and preempts state common law, straining the systemic fact that
the primary location of the common law is in the states.
Sullivan generated cooperative judicial federalism because it took an internal
point of view with respect to Alabama’s common law of libel. By taking a practical
attitude of rule acceptance to state common law, the Court in Sullivan pictured federal
and state courts engaged in the same enterprise: molding or revising state common
law to comply with the First Amendment. Sullivan was an interstitial decision: it
identified a “gap” in state law (namely, the rule permitting an official to recover libel
damages for a publication criticizing official conduct), and filled the gap using the
First Amendment.489 And Brennan did not create a federal general common law of
484 Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 317, 344 (2009) (describing the doctrinal landscape defined by Sullivan as “relatively
settled and stable”).
485 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1049.
486 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
487 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (1953).
488 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
489 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261, 283–85 (1964).
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libel. It’s fashionable to say that Sullivan “federalized” or “constitutionalized” defama-
tion; sometimes Sullivan is described very differently as “h[o]ld[ing] Alabama’s
defamation tort unconstitutional.”490 These are exaggerations, and the truth lies
somewhere in the middle. Brennan introduced a federal element for public officials
alleging that criticism of their official conduct was defamatory. That federal rule did
not colonize state common law wholesale.
Sullivan created the right conditions for cooperative judicial federalism by
ensuring that the First Amendment operated against the background of the state
common law. On this view, the First Amendment functions by altering or supplanting
legal relationships established by the states. It is therefore necessary first to look at
the substantive operation of state common law by reference to the rights, duties,
privileges, powers, and immunities that it creates, changes, or abolishes. Once the
substantive operation of the state common law is discerned, the First Amendment
modifies that substantive operation if necessary. This methodology encourages
cooperative judicial federalism because it does not pit federal law against state law.
The federal question is reached only if, from the perspective of a judicial officer who
accepts state common law as a practical guide for action, the substantive operation
of the state’s common law infringes the First Amendment. This generates varied
questions of state and federal law in which both state and federal courts are competent,
creating opportunities for intersystemic dialogue.
A sampling of recent defamation cases in state courts vividly illustrates that
Sullivan embraced cooperative judicial federalism. In D Magazine Partners, L.P. v.
Rosenthal,491 for example, the Texas Supreme Court amply demonstrated that its
common law had assimilated the federal constitutional requirements while leaving
room for an analysis of defamation elements under state law (including defamatory
“gist,” requirements of a prima facie case, and various defenses). In Elliott v.
Murdock,492 the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a statement was not defamatory
490 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1395 (2017). See
also John C.P. Goldberg, Benjamin Cardozo and the Death of the Common Law, 34 TOURO
L. REV. 147, 151 (2018) (“[S]tarting with New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
has shown itself prepared to deem entire swaths of state tort law null and void, often in the
name of protecting business interests.”).
491 529 S.W. 3d 429, 433 (Tex. 2017) (noting “the longstanding yet delicate balance”
between the First Amendment’s “need for a vigorous and uninhibited press” and the state’s
“legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury”); id. at 440 (applying, consistently with
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), “a negligence standard in cases involving
a private plaintiff seeking defamation damages from a media defendant”). 
492 385 P.3d 459, 465–66 (Idaho 2016) (“This Court, in reliance on the United States Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Gertz, has held that an individual can become a public figure on
a limited range of issues through voluntary public engagement on those issues.”); id. at 466
(observing that “[e]ven if, for the purposes of argument, the statements are accepted as
defamatory, [plaintiffs] fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [they] are
public figures” to whom Sullivan’s actual malice standard applies). 
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under state law before deciding that, in any event, plaintiff was a public figure. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Edwards v. Commonwealth,493 assessed
the adequacy of a defamation complaint according to federal standards as incor-
porated into Massachusetts law. And the Court observed that an independent basis
existed under state law to impose the actual malice standard. In SIRQ, Inc. v. The
Layton Companies, Inc.,494 the Utah Supreme Court applied state law as guided by
Sullivan and reversed the trial judge’s failure to properly conduct an initial inquiry
to ensure that only statements capable of defamatory meaning made it to the jury in
a false light claim. The Maryland Court of Appeals has incorporated Sullivan as a
“First Amendment conditional privilege.”495 “Although defamation jurisprudence
traces its origins to a number of seminal First Amendment cases of the United States
Supreme Court,” the Court insisted that “the resolution of defamation claims brought
by private individuals has largely been left to the province of state courts.”496
Snyder operated very differently. It sidestepped Maryland law altogether: IIED
was mentioned in passing and intrusion upon seclusion was silently preempted.497
The First Amendment inquiry was acontextual, divorced from the substantive
operation of state common law. The First Amendment, in other words, did not operate
interstitially “against the background of the total corpus juris of the states”;498 rather,
the federal question overtook the whole litigation. And its application to a whole
swathe of torts—IIED, intrusion upon seclusion, intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress—strongly suggests
that Snyder created a federal general common law, which largely preempts state
speech torts. Nor has Snyder developed in the usual common law way. It has not
sparked an incremental reform of IIED law; rather, it has sparked an absolutist
application of the First Amendment, underwritten by an expansive public concern
test.499 A natural consequence of this absolutism is the hyperstability and predictabil-
ity of the doctrinal regime thus generated. A federal law, severed from an underlying
state right of action, has preempted a static, external vision of state common law.
State courts applying Snyder engage in backwards avoidance. They decide a
momentous federal constitutional question to avoid ordinary issues of state private
493 76 N.E.3d 248, 256–59 (Mass. 2017) (citing Massachusetts cases incorporating Sullivan’s
actual malice requirement into state law).
494 379 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Utah 2016) (quoting state court opinions for the proposition that
false light claims are “predicated on publication of a defamatory statement” and “reside in
the shadow of the First Amendment”) (quoting Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842
P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1992) and Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005)); id. at 1246
(“[F]alse light claims that arise from defamatory speech raise the same First Amendment
concerns as are implicated by defamation claims.”).
495 Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 149 A.3d 573, 576, 581 (Md. 2016).
496 Id. at 575.
497 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–60 (2011).
498 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 487, at 435.
499 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451–53.
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law. We have seen, for example, that state courts applying Snyder to economic torts
like intentional interference do not consider whether those torts actually contravene
the First Amendment. In Cleaveland, the trial judge was “skeptical that a claim for
tortious interference with contractual relations exists in circumstances such as those
presented here,” but held that the Court “need not reach this issue as the enforcement
of such a tort is an infringement on the Respondents’ right to free speech and ex-
pression under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”500 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire mirrored this reasoning.501 The Court consciously refused
to follow its usual practice of “normally address[ing] constitutional questions first under
the State Constitution and rely[ing] on federal law only to aid in [its] analysis.”502
Instead, although the Court “share[d] the trial court’s skepticism” concerning the
intentional interference tort, it agreed that “[it] need not decide whether a viable
tortious interference claim can exist under the circumstances present in this case,”
because Snyder precluded recovery.503
Although it ignored Maryland law, Snyder nevertheless held that there was only
one way that Maryland law could be reconciled with the First Amendment, namely,
the creation of an all-purpose federal defense.504 It is one thing to say, as Snyder does,
that the First Amendment incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment limits state com-
mon law.505 No one disputes that, and it is consistent with the scribal attitude of the
federal courts towards state law (I argued above that federal courts take a scribal atti-
tude to state law, and state courts take an authorial attitude to state law). It is entirely
500 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, Nos. 213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241, 2013 WL
8691664, at *10 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
501 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 260–61 (N.H. 2015).
502 Id. at 258.
503 Id. at 259. In Rodriguez, the Arizona court noted that starting with the First Amend-
ment rather than state law would “avoid a ‘prolonged, costly, and inevitably futile trial.’”
Rodriguez v. Fox News Network L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (internal
citation omitted). The flip side of this concern, however, is that an incorrect First Amendment
determination in state court will truncate the application of state law, resulting in a costly
appeal and remand process. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991)
(“The Minnesota Supreme Court’s incorrect conclusion that the First Amendment barred
Cohen’s claim may well have truncated its consideration of whether a promissory estoppel
claim had otherwise been established under Minnesota law and whether Cohen’s jury verdict
could be upheld on a promissory estoppel basis. Or perhaps the State Constitution may be
construed to shield the press from a promissory estoppel cause of action such as this one.
These are matters for the Minnesota Supreme Court to address and resolve in the first instance
on remand.”). Henry Monaghan observed that in Snyder the Court exercised its power to
select the precise issues for determination. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance,
Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 696–97 (2012).
504 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451.
505 See id. at 460 (“As we have noted, ‘the sensitivity and significance of the interests pre-
sented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.’”).
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another to say, also as Snyder does, that there is only one way to enforce that limit. That
is a separate and stronger claim that the First and Fourteenth Amendments completely
determine the application of the limit across a whole class of state torts (common law
and statutory).
The difficulty associated with the stronger claim—that state tort law can be
reconciled with the First Amendment only by creating an all-purpose federal defense—
is that it robs state courts of their authorial attitude, that is, their capacity to develop
their own law by taking a critical reflective attitude towards it. As we have seen, the
state courts applying Snyder ignore their own tort law and their own constitutions,
and do not decide how to square their own law with the First Amendment.506 Instead,
they are required to unthinkingly obey Snyder’s command. And this command trans-
lates to directives to state courts: do not bother fussing over your local law; do not
worry about the possibility of a different division of authority between judge and jury;
do not fret about pointless jury instructions.
Snyder makes state courts mere scribes of their own law. The federal structure
contemplates that a state-created right of action is governed by state law, unless
federal law applies. The starting point is state law, followed by the enforcement of
an interstitial national law to achieve its special and targeted objective. Snyder’s
absolutism flips the starting point.507 As it has been applied in state courts, the starting
point is not the state law purporting to legitimize the jury verdict, but instead whether
the speech is protected.508 And this requires state courts to take a brief static snapshot
of state tort law to predict the likelihood of liability attaching to speech. Rather than
ask whether the state common law in fact impinges on the First Amendment and, if
so, how it could be modified to remove the inconsistency, Snyder simply invalidates
the state law in its predicted application.
Snyder therefore raises the question: if the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and Erie, embody judicially developed federal commands, and the IIED tort is a
judicially developed state right of action, why not allow state courts to do the heavy
lifting? Why deny state courts the capacity to develop their own common law, over
which they are ordinarily sovereign (in the absence of applicable federal law), consis-
tently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than require them to obey
a defense effectively legislated by the Supreme Court?
Had he looked a little harder, Roberts might have embraced cooperative judicial
federalism and the internal perspective towards state common law. Snyder, in its
rejection of the authorial perspective, failed to notice the true nature of IIED’s
outrageousness requirement. It failed to realize, moreover, that IIED targets conduct
that is not just outrageous, but both extreme and outrageous; a “double limitation”
which “requires both that the character of the conduct be outrageous and that the
506 See supra notes 500–05.
507 Cf. Kalven, supra note 52, at 191–92.
508 See supra notes 500–05.
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conduct be sufficiently unusual to be extreme.”509 And Snyder refused to consider the
different roles of judge and jury in an IIED claim—discussed in Harris v. Jones510 and
described in the Third Restatement as the “court play[ing] a more substantial screening
role on the questions of extreme and outrageous conduct and the severity of the
harm”511—as a potential cure for the constitutional defect. The judge “first makes
a judgment . . . as to whether the conduct alleged could be found extreme and out-
rageous and the harm sufficiently severe such that liability is permissible,” and, if
so, “submits the case for the jury to determine whether the defendant engaged in ex-
treme and outrageous conduct and whether the plaintiff suffered severe emotional
harm.”512 Snyder simply did not explain why these common law rules ran afoul of
the First Amendment.
Put differently, Snyder is functionally equivalent to a First Amendment collateral
attack. This external, collateral attack simply fixes on a verdict enforcing a state right
of action against a speaker. The state law basis underwriting the verdict—for example,
the tort or theory of liability, the legal source (common law, legislation, or both)—is
entirely ignored. The effect of Snyder’s methodology is to change the right of action
completely. The state courts practicing backwards avoidance transform the plaintiff’s
state tort allegation into a First Amendment claim of the defendant. Snyder thus
contributed to the “epidemic pathology” that state courts parrot U.S. Supreme Court
reasoning on constitutional issues.513 In the result, neither federal nor state courts
answer questions of state law that cry out for resolution, silencing state-federal
judicial dialogue and denying intellectual and decisional resources—the “guidance,
509 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).
510 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Harris v. Jones, the case Roberts cited to establish that
Maryland recognized IIED, was sensitive to the “particularly troublesome question” of
“[w]hether the conduct of a defendant has been ‘extreme and outrageous.’” Id. at 614. Citing
other state courts, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in Harris v. Jones that “[i]t is for the
court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be
regarded as extreme and outrageous,” and, where reasonable minds may differ, “it is for the
jury to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme
and outrageous to result in liability.” Id. at 615.
511 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).
512 Id.
513 Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 726
(2016). For defamation actions, where one might think that the gravitational force of Sullivan’s
“federal rule” would be overwhelming, it is noteworthy that state courts claim a significant
degree of decisional independence. See, e.g., Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 149 A.3d 573, 575
(Md. 2016) (“[T]he resolution of defamation claims brought by private individuals has largely
been left to the province of State courts.”); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 73
(W.Va. 1981) (critical of the state of defamation law after Sullivan, but noting that “Sullivan and
its progeny . . . placed a first amendment, free speech gloss upon all prior law of defamation”
and “permitted the states to adopt their own standards of liability in defamation actions”).
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perspective, inspiration, reassurance, or cautionary tales”514—offered by the discoursive
method of the common law.
C. Making Snyder Cooperative
How, then, should Snyder have been written to embrace cooperative judicial
federalism? One approach is to mimic Hustler for private-figure IIED lawsuits, which
would require a plaintiff to show Sullivan-brand actual malice.515 Falwell failed to
make out his IIED claim because the advertising parody of which he complained did
not contain a false statement of fact made with knowledge, or in reckless disregard,
of its falsity.516 But actual malice is custom-made for public figures, who attain that
status by position alone or by “thrusting their personality into the vortex of an
important public controversy.”517 Another reason that actual malice is inapt stems
from its commitment to a conception of truth and falsity. Truth or falsity is part of
the defamation cause of action (and, for that matter, a false-light invasion of privacy
cause of action); but in an IIED suit, extreme and outrageous speech that is not readily
characterizable as true or false can nevertheless cause severe emotional harm.
A second option is to take up the Restatement’s suggestion and imbue certain
aspects of the IIED cause of action with constitutional significance. This could
require, for example, a judge to make an initial assessment of whether the defendant’s
extreme and outrageous conduct reaches a necessary First Amendment threshold,
before submitting the case to the jury. A third option is to adopt the newsworthiness
privilege that exists in various state law privacy torts. To be sure, the newsworthiness
privilege may have its own problems and may closely resemble Snyder’s public
concern test. But it would place responsibility on state courts, as primary authors,
to ensure that their common law conforms to the First Amendment.
The point isn’t to advocate one view over another, but to show that the problem
confronted in Snyder could have been solved in many ways, and that the solution
chosen by Snyder sacrificed state common law and cooperative judicial federalism
on the altar of an absolutist First Amendment. The second and third options outlined
very briefly here are akin to Sullivan. They pick up state common law trends, showing
at least some comity and respect to the states as sovereign authorities backing state
common law, and to the state courts writing that common law. Within the confines of
the First Amendment, these alternatives allow states to author their own common law.
514 Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children”:
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633,
1642 (2004).
515 See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
516 See id. at 56–57.
517 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
The application of the First Amendment to state common law torts is a continual,
sometimes urgent, problem. In 1967, the Supreme Court of Texas decided Fisher v.
Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,518 the well-known “plate grabbing” case. Emmit E. Fisher,
a black NASA mathematician, had been invited to attend a conference in Houston.519
After the morning session, attendees adjourned for a buffet lunch at a whites-only
private club.520 As Fisher stood in line, an employee approached him, snatched the
plate from his hand, and shouted that he could not be served in the club.521 There was
no direct physical contact and Fisher did not apprehend any physical injury.522 He was
highly embarrassed and hurt by the hotel employee’s conduct in the presence of
colleagues.523 The Texas Supreme Court held “that the forceful dispossession of . . .
Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to constitute a battery.”524
After Snyder, there is a real question as to whether Fisher—“a landmark racial
discrimination case”525—remains good law. In 2014, when considering a discussion
draft of the Third Restatement of intentional torts to persons, two ALI members
doubted Fisher on First Amendment grounds.526 This Article has endeavored to explain
that the danger is not only that cases like Fisher come out differently after Snyder.
The danger is also systemic: that Snyder forecloses plaintiffs and courts from alleging,
reasoning, and judging that certain conduct is right or wrong under the local standards
of state tort law.
Sullivan, as we have seen, does not pose the same systemic risk,527 because it took
state common law seriously. Its methodology recognizes not only that state common
518 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
519 Id. at 628.
520 Id.
521 Id. at 628–29.
522 Id. at 629.
523 Id.
524 Id. at 630.
525 Richard Delgado, One Man’s Dignity: An Interview with Emmit E. Fisher, in THE
PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY
23 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
526 See Proceedings of 2014 Annual Meeting, 91 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 129–30 (2014).
Peter F. Langrock argued Fisher “raise[d] . . . certain First Amendment questions, which are
not dealt with,” and “[n]o matter how offensive the language may be, there is still the First
Amendment, and we’ve got to protect that.” Id. at 130. Professor George C. Christie also
acknowledged Fisher’s “First Amendment issues.” Id. at 135.
527 Consider, for example, Iowa, where “[t]he judicial heavy lifting necessitated by” Sullivan
“has abated” but where “[t]he dialectal heat generated by the competing interests of [common
law] reputation and freedom of speech continues to simmer.” Patrick J. McNulty & Adam
D. Zenor, Iowa Defamation Law Redux: Sixteen Years After, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 365. 368
(2012) (“Most of the cases decided by the Iowa Supreme Court in the last sixteen years are
private disputes involving application of common law principles,” including significant cases
“in which the principles of the common law and the First Amendment intersect.”).
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law counts as law under Erie, but also that a state common law judgment represents
the local political community’s collective opinion that the defendant wronged the
plaintiff. At the same time, it recognizes that the defendant should not pay for the
wrong. Importantly, moreover, Sullivan’s approach recognizes that local standards—
the rules and principles of state common law—can themselves be offensive to the
First Amendment and, if so, should be changed accordingly. Sullivan says that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments changed the Alabama law that purported to hold
the Times and the four ministers liable for criticizing an elected public official.528
Because Sullivan adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis state common law, it
permitted state common law to be revised.
Snyder’s methodology is broad; Sullivan’s is deep. Snyder applies across all state
torts; Sullivan responds to the special contours of the right of action. Snyder fixes
only on a verdict; Sullivan reaches into state common law. Neither Sullivan nor
Snyder is an unconstitutional judicial overreach. The better approach is determined,
then, by asking: what is lost or gained in choosing one over the other? What we gain
in choosing Sullivan is the best vision of our judicial federalism. Choosing the internal
point of view towards state common law creates opportunities for cooperative judicial
federalism. Sullivan’s classical common law approach does not silence but encourages
discourse and state-federal judicial dialogue.
528 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–85, 292 (1964).
